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STRIKING MIDDLE GROUND IN AN
APPROACH TO SECRET SETTLEMENTS
The Supreme Court of the United States has repeatedly identi-
fied a strong public policy favoring the private settlement of dis-
putes, largely due to perceived problems of expense and delay
caused by an increasing amount of litigation and the resulting
overcrowding of this country's courts.' It is well recognized that
most filed cases do indeed settle; the number of federal civil cases
that culminate in trial was estimated at only 4% in 1991, a figure
that is thought to apply to state courts as well. 2 Two-thirds of filed
civil cases settle without a judicial ruling. 3 More recent studies
suggest that this trend in favor of settlement continues.4  While
many scholars argue that settlement is not preferable to adjudica-
tion and that courts therefore should not encourage settlement, set-
tlement will undoubtedly continue to occur at a high rate, and thus
it is necessary to consider the appropriate relationship between
courts and private settlement.5
I Brian T. FitzGerald, Note, Sealed v. Sealed: A Public Court System Going Secretly Pri-
vate, 6 J.L. & POL. 381, 406 (1990); see, e.g., Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 12 (1985) (Powell,
J., concurring) ("[Plarties to litigation and the public as a whole have an interest - often an
overriding one - in settlement rather than exhaustion of protracted court proceedings.").
2 Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle ": Judicial Promotion and the Regula-
tion of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1342 (1994).
3 Id. at 1342; see also Blanca Fromm, Bringing Settlement out of the Shadows: Informa-
tion About Settlement in an Age of Confidentiality, 48 UCLA L. REV. 663, 664 (2001) (quoting
Galanter & Cahill's statistics).
4 Laurie Kratky Dore, Secrecy by Consent: The Use and Limits of Confidentiality in the
Pursuit of Settlement, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 283,402 n.l 1 (1999) (citing Samuel R. Gross &
Kent D. Syverud, Don't Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L.
REV. I, 1-2, 63 n.2 (1996) (citing a 1995 study by Professor Theodore Eisenberg at the National
Center for State Courts)).
- See David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619,
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During settlement, often one or more of the parties involved
will not agree to settle without assurance that the terms of settle-
ment will remain confidential.6 Plaintiffs may want to protect their
privacy or may be willing to agree to secrecy in exchange for
greater consideration; defendants may want to avoid exposing
themselves to a flood of litigation by similarly situated plaintiffs
who learn that the defendant may be willing to pay. 7
While settlement terms are typically considered a private con-
tractual matter between parties, problems with settlement confi-
dentiality arise when the presumably public court system is used to
further settlement or when settlement information comes into a
court's possession. Frequently parties choose to file their settle-
ment so that the court will issue a consent decree encompassing
the settlement terms and therefore retain jurisdiction; parties can
then later enforce the agreement through the court's contempt
power without filing a new lawsuit.8 Though the Supreme Court
of the United States has addressed the issue of public access to
discovery documents, 9 the Court has not addressed confidentiality
of settlement terms when such terms are made known to a court.' 0
Jurisdictions vary regarding what standard is applied to determine
whether a court will recognize settlement confidentiality when par-
ties request it, and thus whether the court will prevent public ac-
cess to the documents at issue." Some observers who claim to
represent the public argue that settlements often conceal informa-
tion in which the public has an interest, especially in cases that
2642, 2647 (1995) (revisiting Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984),
arguing that Fiss's arguments do not necessarily support the elimination of all settlements, but
rather can support only the elimination of "wrong" settlements - those that do not fulfill other
values central to public life, such as openness, political transparency, legal justice, and the crea-
tion of public good).
6 Anne-Therese Bechamps, Note, Sealed Out-of-Court Settlements: When Does the Pub-
lic Have a Right to Know?, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 117, 117 (1990); FitzGerald, supra note 1,
at 406-07.
7 Bechamps, supra note 6, at 117; Sharon L. Sobczak, To Seal or Not to Seal? In Search
of Standards, 60 DEF. COUNS. J. 406,407 (1993).
8 Bechamps, supra note 6, at 119.
9 Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984) (holding that a protective order can
be issued regarding pretrial discovery material if good cause is shown). The Court, however,
focused on the litigant's First Amendment right to disseminate discovery information, rather
than the public's First Amendment right of access. FitzGerald, supra note 1, at 389-90. Fitz-
Gerald states that the Court left open the possibility that a First Amendment right may arise
when an interested third party seeks access and that strong dicta indicates that a constitutional
analysis should be applied in the granting of orders to seal public record. Id. at 390.
10 See FitzGerald, supra note 1, at 387 ("[Tlhe federal courts have not created separate
standards for granting the various types of protective orders. Instead, they have focused primar-
ily on the context of information dissemination during the discovery process.").
I Bechamps, supra note 6, at 120.
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expose potential health and safety hazards, and that settlement in-
formation should thus be subject to public access.' 2
Many solutions to the problem of settlement confidentiality
have been proposed by courts and scholars, including bright-line
rules in support of either confidentiality or access, balancing tests
using various factors, and ethical rules.' 3 Some proposed solutions
have been implemented, such as statutory and court-made pre-
sumptions of access.1 4  Recently, the U.S. District Court for the
District of South Carolina became the first federal district to adopt
a bright-line rule making any settlement filed with the court a pub-
lic record, 15 and media attention surrounding this rule has renewed
interest in how courts should handle confidential settlement infor-
mation.' 6  Recent voluminous media coverage has scrutinized the
use of confidential settlements by Catholic priests and other reli-
gious figures in cases of alleged sexual abuse.17
This Note argues that when a court determines whether set-
tlement terms will remain confidential, the use of a blanket, bright-
line rule, or even an across-the-board balancing test for all types of
settlements, is not appropriate due to the unique public interest in
certain types of cases. For most cases, a general balancing ap-
proach should be used and confidentiality should usually be re-
12 E.g., Ass'N OF TRIAL LAW. OF AM. & ROSCOE POUND INST., SECRECY KILLS: How
GAG ORDERS AND SECRECY AGREEMENTS AFFECT JUSTICE AND JOURNALISM (2001) (present-
ing an Internet project containing a collection of resources from the two anti-secrecy groups), at
http://atla.org/secrecy/data/toc.aspx; LITIGATION GROUP, PUBLIC CrrIZEN, OPEN COURT PRO-
CEEDINGS: CHALLENGES TO PROTECTIVE ORDERS, at http://www.citizen.org/cmep/energy-
enviro nuclear/articles.cfm?ID=1068 (last visited Sept. 17, 2003).
13 For example, "sunshine" requirements have been implemented in Florida and Texas. In
Florida, a court order or private settlement cannot conceal information regarding a "public haz-
ard." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081 (West Supp. 2003). In Texas, a presumption of access is cre-
ated regarding court records, which are broadly defined to include even unfiled settlement
agreements that address certain subjects. TEX. R. CIv. P. §§ 76a(l), (2)(a)-(b) (Vernon Supp.
2002). Laurie Dore, for example, defines balancing factors that should be used specifically in
the settlement stage of litigation. Dore, supra note 4. Richard Zitrin, for example, argues that
the development of ethical rules is a better solution to the problems of secret settlement than are
statutes or court rules. Richard Zitrin, Why Lawyers Keep Secrets About Public Harm, PROF.
LAW., Summer 2001, at 1. These solutions are addressed later in this Note.
14 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081; TEX. R. CIv. P. § 76a; Jessup v. Luther, 277 F.3d
926 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that settlement agreements filed with the court are subject to public
access absent a compelling interest in confidentiality); Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23
F.3d 772 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that the public has access to those records actually filed with a
court).
15 D.S.C. LOCAL CIv. R. 5.03(C) (effective Nov. 1, 2002), at http://www.scd.uscourts.
gov/Notices/LR503.pdf.
16 E.g., 60 Minutes I: Secret Settlements (Internet coverage of CBS television broadcast,
Jan. 15, 2003) (providing the lead story on 60 Minutes I1 with Dan Rather, which addressed
settlement confidentiality and the South Carolina rule), at http://www.cbsnews.comisto-
ries/2003/01/15/60Imain53664I.shtml; see infra notes 218-31 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 269-89 and accompanying text.
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spected. However, several categories of settled cases should be
identified as uniquely important to the public, such as product li-
ability and sexual abuse cases, and those cases should be subjected
to different balancing standards that account for the strong public
interest in the information. However, due to the difficulty of con-
cretely defining such categories and to the possibility of extreme
factual situations, some judicial discretion remains necessary, and
a bright-line rule even for the enumerated categories is not appro-
priate. This definition of a general balancing test and a special
balancing test for certain types of settlements should be achieved
through the development of a court rule.
Part I describes current judicial and legislative approaches
taken in regard to the confidentiality of settlement agreements.
Part II describes problems with these current systems. Part III de-
scribes reforms that have been proposed by different scholars and
by lawmakers in various jurisdictions. Part IV explains how those
reforms are inadequate and proposes two balancing tests that take
into account the unique public interests that arise in certain types
of settled cases. Part V applies the proposed balancing tests to
several situations, such as the recent Catholic priest sexual abuse
scandal, and demonstrates how the proposed rule achieves appro-
priate results.
I. THE CURRENT SITUATION
Secrecy in court is typically achieved via one of three ave-
nues. First, all parties may stipulate or one party may request that
the court issue a protective order that restricts the dissemination of
discovery materials. Second, sealing orders prevent public access
to either certain court records or to an entire trial, including a jury
verdict or court decision. Lastly, settlements may contain a confi-
dentiality provision that is recognized and/or enforced by a court.18
Most courts apply the same standard when deciding to recognize
secrecy in each of these three situations, although the situations
occur at different stages of the judicial process.' 9
A. Different Views of the Judicial Function and Other
Confidentiality Arguments
The confidentiality rule adopted in a given jurisdiction may
depend on what that jurisdiction's rule-making court or legislature
perceives to be the primary function of courts in society.20 Some
18 Dore, supra note 4, at 283.
'9 FitzGerald, supra note 1, at 387.
20 Sobczak, supra note 7, at 407-08.
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law-making bodies and some scholars recognize the traditional
role of dispute resolution as the primary function of civil courts.
By this view, courts do not represent the interests of the general
public, despite being publicly funded institutions. These analysts
argue that a reduction in the use of confidentiality in courts is in-
appropriate if the reduction is motivated by a perceived need to
disseminate information to the public. Such dissemination is a
mere secondary effect of the current system and thus is an im-
proper aim for the courts.2 j Confidentiality is considered desirable
because it expedites the dispute resolution process by making par-
ties more willing to exchange information and engage in candid
negotiation.22
Similarly, some scholars argue for the continued acceptance
of confidentiality in courts because existing executive and admin-
istrative agencies at the local, state, and federal levels are believed
to be the appropriate institutions to disseminate necessary informa-
tion to the public.23 For example, federal statutes such as the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 2 4 and the Consumer Product Safety
Act25 require the reporting of health and safety information and
grant federal authorities the power to investigate and disseminate
information to the public. Some argue that if problems exist re-
garding public access to information, changes should be made
through such agencies; agency responsibilities should not be
shifted to the courts.2 6
In addition to arguments regarding the court's primary aim of
dispute resolution, the facilitation of settlement is important be-
cause settlement avoids the costs of trial for both the litigants and
the overburdened judicial system. Settlement creates finality on
which people can decide their actions, and even "results in higher
levels of satisfaction to the litigants, having determined their own
solution to their dispute rather than being subjected to a judicially-
created solution. 27 The right to contract freely is said to include
the right to bargain regarding confidentiality.28
21 E.g., Arthur Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts,
105 HARV. L. REV. 427,431 (1991).
22 Id. at 463-77.
23 Id. at 488-89; see also Richard A. Epstein, Editorial, The Disclosure Dilemma: Why a
Ban on Secret Settlements Does More Harm Than Good, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 3, 2002 (argu-
ing that government agencies should have the duty to protect the public in situations like the
Firestone/Ford tire defect cases and the Roman Catholic church child molestation cases), avail-
able at http://foi.missouri.edu/statefoi/disclosuredilemma.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2003) (on file
with Case Western Reserve Law Review).
24 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-397 (2000).
- 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2084 (2000).
26 Miller, supra note 21, at 489.
27 Christine M. Tomko, Comment, Can You Keep a Secret?: Discoverability and Admis-
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Critics of confidentiality contend that governmental regula-
tory agencies have not "yet fulfilled their promise" to protect the
public and may be inadequate to do so. 29 Until such agencies pro-
vide sufficient protection, our system is unsatisfactory if it requires
courts to remain silent while more of the public is harmed.3° Other
scholars and law-making bodies believe that as public institutions,
courts should promote broader social goals through the litigation
process. These analysts argue that judges should not keep infor-
mation confidential if the public would benefit from disclosure,
even when the parties agree to such confidentiality. Public bene-
fits include the prevention of duplicated discovery efforts and the
notice of public safety and health hazards. As the wealthiest and
most widely influential parties, such as big corporations, have the
resources necessary to negotiate for confidentiality, and because
those parties anticipate suffering greatly from negative publicity
sibility of Confidential Settlement Agreement Amounts in Ohio, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 833,
850 (2002).
28 See infra note 243 and accompanying text.
29 Jack B. Weinstein, Secrecy in Civil Trials: Some Tentative Views, 9 J.L. & POL'Y 53,
59 (2000).
30 Judge Jack Weinstein describes the inadequacies of agency protection:
Although the Consumer Product Safety Act ("CPSA") requires manufacturers to re-
port defects that have or may cause serious injury or death, substantial underreport-
ing appears to be the rule. Just a few hundred product hazard reports from nearly
two million businesses engaged in manufacturing, distributing, or selling consumer
products are said to be received annually.
Id. at 59 (footnotes omitted) (citing Michael R. Lemov & Malcolm D. Woolf, Underreporting
Defects Is Risky, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 14, 1992, at S6).
Additionally, while some state statutes do require parties like professional liability insur-
ers, self-insured health care providers, and uninsured providers to report settlements to a state
authority, most states do not require the state boards to provide that information to the general
public. Fromm, supra note 3, at 695-96 (citing, inter alia, 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 1301.841-A(c) (West 1999) (repealed Mar. 20, 2002)). For example, a Pennsylvania statute
currently requires medical professional liability insurers and self-insured providers to report
settlements to their licensing board, but the information is not considered public information
until it is used in a formal disciplinary proceeding. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1303.746 (West
Supp. 2003). Another Pennsylvania statute allows licensing boards access to patient medical
records despite a confidential settlement agreement between the patient and the insurer or pro-
vider. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1303.906 (West Supp. 2003). However, materials used solely
for investigation by the Pennsylvania State Board of Medicine or the State Board of Osteopathic
Medicine are confidential. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1303.907 (West Supp. 2003). In July
2003, a Pennsylvania bill mandating the development of a public data repository including
medical malpractice settlements over $50,000, PA. H.B. 158 (2003), went to the Senate Com-
mittee on the Judiciary.
Florida does make such information public record. Fromm, supra note 3, at 695-96 (cit-
ing, inter alia, FLA. DEP'T OF FIN. SERVS., PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY CLOSED CLAIMS DIS-
CLAIMER AND NOTICE ("The reports on this site stem from patient or client allegations and are
public record."), available at http://doi.state.fl.us/Liability/disclaimer.htm (last visited Sept. 17,
2003) (on file with the Case Western Reserve Law Review)). Some states will allow scholars
access for research and educational use. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1855.02(C)
(West 1999) ("The board shall maintain the reports filed in accordance with this section as
confidential records. Statistical data derived from these reports shall be released only for bona
fide research or educational purposes.").
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and additional litigation, commentators claim that the very settle-
ment information that would most help the public is the most
likely to be confidential. 31 The public does not have access to
formal and informal attorney networks through which confidential
settlement information may be exchanged and even published,
such as bar associations and alumni networks. Nor does the public
have access to first-hand information available to "repeat play-
ers" - attorneys and defendants who have previously participated
in similar litigation. 32 Additionally, it is argued that the public has
an interest in monitoring the use of public resources, including the
functioning of courts.33
B. Two Potential Sources of a Public Right of Access
Proponents of public access to court records and settlement
agreements advance two types of reasons for a public right of ac-
cess, deriving alternatively from the Constitution of the United
States and from the common law.34 The rights of access under the
Constitution and the common law are similar, though, and many
courts confuse the two sources or subject the rights derived from
the two sources to identical analyses.35 Most opposition to confi-
dentiality based on a public interest argument comes not from liti-
gants but from the news media, the plaintiffs' bar, and third-party
intervenors who claim to represent the general public.36
1. Constitutional Arguments
Those who make a constitutional argument generally assert
that court confidentiality implicates the First Amendment, which
empowers the public as a "judicial watchdog., 37  The Supreme
Court of the United States indeed recognized a qualified constitu-
tional right of access to criminal trials and other associated pro-
ceedings in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,38 and several
circuits have analogized this rule to apply to civil trials.39 The Su-
3' Especially in situations involving exceptionally large settlements, plaintiffs may not
want others to know of the amount received, and defendants may be concerned about the en-
couragement of future lawsuits; therefore, large settlements may be more likely to be confiden-
tial. Fromm, supra note 3, at 689-90.
32 Id. at 697-700.
33 Dore, supra note 4, at 308-09; Miller, supra note 2 1, at 430, 477.
34 Bechamps, supra note 6, at 119.
35 Id. at 120; Dore, supra note 4, at 321.
6 Sobczak, supra note 7, at 408.
37 Id.
38 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
31 In Richmond Newspapers, the Court limited its holding to the criminal context, but the
Court stated in a footnote that "historically both civil and criminal trials have been presump-
tively open." Id. at 580 n.17. For a case in which lower federal courts have thus extended the
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preme Court, however, has subsequently applied its Richmond
Newspapers rule only to the criminal trial process and never to
court records or to civil proceedings.
40
Another First Amendment argument has been made in the
context of orders protecting the confidentiality of discovery mate-
rials in a civil case. Under this argument, such confidentiality or-
ders can be likened to prior restraints on a litigant's speech, and
thus requests for protective orders should be subject to strict scru-
tiny analysis rather than to the "good cause" standard articulated in
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c). 4 1 The Supreme Court re-
jected this analogy between discovery-related protective orders
and prior restraints in Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart,42 a case in
which the court upheld a protective order that addressed discovery
material containing information about members and donors of a
religious organization. The Court reasoned that because litigants
do not have an independent right to discovery material outside of
the litigation context and because protective orders only limit the
dissemination of material obtained through discovery, court con-
trol over discovery materials need not be held to "exacting First
Amendment scrutiny. 43
The Court in Seattle Times applied a two-prong test to deter-
mine whether or not a litigant has a First Amendment right to dis-
holding to civil proceedings, see Westmoreland v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 752 F.2d 16, 23 (2d
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1017 (1985):
[T]he First Amendment does secure to the public and to the press a right of access to
civil proceedings in accordance with the dicta of the Justices in Richmond Newspa-
pers, because public access to civil trials enhances the quality and safeguards the in-
tegrity of the factfinding process, fosters an appearance of fairness, and heightens
public respect for the judicial process, while permitting the public to participate in
and serve as a check upon the judicial process - an essential component in our struc-
ture of self government.
Id. (quotations and citations omitted); see also, e.g., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v.
FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1177 (6th Cir. 1983) ("Although we reject the suggestion that the [Free-
dom of Information Act] places limitations on the District Court's discretion to seal court
documents, the First Amendment and the common law do limit judicial discretion."), cert. de-
nied, 465 U.S. 1100 (1984). These and additional cases are listed and analyzed in Bechamps,
supra note 6, at 134-38 and accompanying footnotes; Sobczak, supra note 7, at 408, 420 n.16.
40 See Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enter. II), 478 U.S. 1 (1986) (transcripts
of a preliminary hearing in a criminal murder prosecution); Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court
(Press-Enter. I), 464 U.S. 501 (1984) (transcript of jury selection voir dire proceedings in a rape
and murder trial); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982) (testimony of a
minor complainant in a rape trial). The Court has not explicitly refused to apply access to civil
cases, but it has denied certiorari in civil cases in which the Richmond Newspapers rule has been
extended. See, e.g., Westmoreland, 752 F.2d 16, cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1017 (1985); Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 710 F.2d 1165, cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100 (1984). For an explana-
tion of Supreme Court cases subsequent to Richmond Newspapers, see Bechamps, supra note 6,
at 138; Sobczak, supra note 7, at 408.
41 Miller, supra note 21, at 436.
42 467 U.S. 20 (1984).
43 Id. at 33.
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seminate information obtained only for purposes of court proceed-
ings: first, whether the material was a source of information tradi-
tionally available to the public; and second, whether the protective
order furthered a substantial government interest. 44 Regarding the
discovery materials at issue, the Court determined that discovery
materials were not traditionally available to the public and that the
protective orders furthered a substantial governmental interest in
protecting the litigants from harm that could result from dissemi-
nation of the discovery information.45
The Supreme Court has not addressed confidentiality situa-
tions in civil cases outside of the discovery context. 46
2. Common Law Arguments
While courts do not generally recognize a constitutional right
of access, a common law right of access is indeed recognized by
most courts.47 The common law has presumed public access to all
unsealed materials filed with a court, and the presumption has been
applied to pretrial hearing transcripts, administrative proceeding
records, documents filed in support of motions, and submitted set-
tlement agreements.48 Justifications for the presumption include
providing public education about the court system, enabling the
public to serve as a watchdog regarding general court functioning
and regarding the use of public resources, supporting an image of
judicial fairness, and recognizing a "general public interest" in cer-
tain types of cases.49
Such a right of access has commonly been applied to trial
documents and documents filed in favor of dispositive motions on
the merits, but it has not commonly been applied to documents that
have no direct relation to court action. This limited application of
the right may be due to the belief that the arguments for public ac-
cess, such as public education and public monitoring, are best
achieved when the court has taken some action. 50 Additionally, a
right of public access may not apply to filed documents that may
44 This two-prong test is derived from the test that the Supreme Court developed for First
Amendment claims of access to criminal proceedings: first, the Court considers the historical
accessibility of the stage of the proceeding at issue; and second, the Court considers the func-
tional utility of public access - "whether public access plays a significant positive role in the
functioning of the particular process in question." Press-Enter. 11, 478 U.S. at 8; Dore, supra
note 4, at 321 n.152.
45 Press-Enter. II, 478 U.S. at 33-37.
46 See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
47 Bechamps, supra note 6, at 120.
41 Id.; Sobczak, supra note 7, at 409.
49 Bechamps, supra note 6, at 134; Sobczak, supra note 7, at 409.
50 Sobczak, supra note 7, at 410.
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"become a vehicle for improper purposes." 5' In Nixon v. Warner
Communications, Inc. ,52 the Supreme Court suggested that White
House tape recordings obtained by subpoena over opposition of
the sitting President could be held inaccessible due to concerns
about commercial exploitation of the tapes.53
As the public rights of access based on the Constitution and
the common law are generally treated identically by courts, this
Note will not address from where a public right of access to confi-
dential settlement information more appropriately derives.
C. The Baseline Confidentiality Rule in the Federal Courts
The status quo or baseline confidentiality rule in the federal
civil system emphasizes a trial court's discretion to address confi-
dentiality on a case-by-case basis.54  Regarding the issue of dis-
covery confidentiality, Rule 26(c) allows a court, "for good cause
shown," to block discovery completely or to provide for confiden-
tiality by limiting, for example, the methods of discovery, the sub-
ject matter discovered, and who may be present at discovery.55
According to Rule 26(c), the court may mandate that discovery
materials be sealed and opened only by the court, or that certain
information not be revealed or only be revealed in a designated
way. In following Rule 26(c), federal courts have generally
adopted a balancing test regarding the confidentiality of discovery
materials, allowing the court to issue a protective order mandating
confidentiality if there is "good cause" for doing so and if a party's
51 Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978). The Court cited
cases suggesting that all material disclosed in private litigation, even if filed with the court, is
not presumptively public:
It is uncontested, however, that the right to inspect and copy judicial records is not
absolute. Every court has supervisory power over its own records and files, and ac-
cess has been denied where court files might have become a vehicle for improper
purposes. For example, the common-law right of inspection has bowed before the
power of a court to insure that its records are not "used to gratify private spite or
promote public scandal" through the publication of "the painful and sometimes dis-
gusting details of a divorce case." Similarly, courts have refused to permit their files
to serve as reservoirs of libelous statements for press consumption, or as sources of
business information that might harm a litigant's competitive standing.
Id. (citations omitted).
52 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
5- Id. at 600-03. The Court, however, seemed to base its decision not to disclose the tapes
on the fact that Congress had already established an administrative procedure, through the
Presidential Recordings Act, to screen public access to presidential tapes and documents. Id. at
603; see also Sobczak, supra note 7, at 410 (interpreting Nixon to suggest that pretrial proceed-
ings differ in stature from actual trial proceedings for purposes of disclosure).
54 Bechamps, supra note 6, at 118 ("American courts have long recognized that decisions
concerning access to court records are committed to the discretion of the trial judge."); Dore,
supra note 4, at 310.
55 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
[Vol. 54:2
2003] RESPECTING LITIGANTS' PRIVACYAND PUBLIC NEEDS 513
interest in confidentiality outweighs harm that might occur to the
other party.56 Federal law does not enumerate the specific factors
to be balanced or their respective weights, so the trial judge is gen-
erally given wide discretion regarding what to balance and how.
57
The burden initially rests on the party opposing discovery to
demonstrate that Rule 26 applies, such as by showing the involve-
ment of "'a trade secret or other confidential research, develop-
ment or commercial information,"' that "'good cause"' exists for
the issuance of a protective order, and that a particularized harm
might result from disclosure. The burden then shifts to the party
seeking discovery to show relevance and the need for the informa-
tion. If the party seeking discovery demonstrates both relevance
and need, the court then balances that party's need for information
against injury that might result from disclosure. If the court in-
deed determines from this balancing that the contested discovery
should occur, the court has discretion to determine if that discov-
ery ought to be limited in any way.58 Since the Supreme Court has
not defined a test for confidentiality situations outside of the dis-
covery context, this test can be considered a baseline for settle-
ment confidentiality as well.
D. Different Approaches to Settlement Confidentiality
in Different Jurisdictions
Supporters of applying such a balancing test to the settlement
context, and thus of maintaining the status quo, argue that by
granting the trial court wide discretion to determine on a case-by-
case basis the factors to balance and to fashion an appropriate seal-
ing order, the existing practice sufficiently allows courts to con-
sider and protect the public interest.59 On the other hand, advo-
cates of legislative or procedural reform argue that courts cannot
properly consider the benefits of public access due to a self-
interest in docket clearing, a desire to respect the wishes of the
immediate parties, and the push for judicial management of trials
and judicial encouragement of settlement.60 In general, different
jurisdictions have taken differing approaches in relating the Rule
26 discovery analysis to the context of confidential settlements. A
few jurisdictions have developed a statutory source of a public
right of access to confidential settlement information. Others have
56 Miller, supra note 21, at 432-36.
57 Id. at 435-36.
58 Id. at 433-34 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)).
59 Dore, supra note 4, at 310.
60 Id. at 310-11.
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used procedural rules to achieve the same end. Attempts at federal
reform, however, have been largely unsuccessful, and only a hand-
ful of states have limited the use of confidential settlements in
these ways.6'
1. State Approaches to a Right of Access
Florida, which adopted a statute, and Texas, which adopted a
procedural rule, were the first states to impose "sunshine" re-
quirements.6 z The Florida statute prohibits a court from entering
any order or judgment that "has the purpose or effect of concealing
a public hazard or any information concerning a public hazard," or
"any information which may be useful to members of the public in
protecting themselves from injury which may result from the pub-
lic hazard., 63  The Florida statute also voids any provision of a
private settlement that conceals information concerning public
hazards. 64
Texas has promulgated the broadest sunshine reform. 65 Texas
Rule of Civil Procedure 76a creates a presumption of public access
to court records, which are defined broadly to include "settlement
agreements not filed of record" that "have a probable adverse ef-
fect upon the general public health or safety, or the administration
of public office, or the operation of government." 66 The rule does
not cover references to monetary settlement amounts or documents
filed in camera to obtain a discovery ruling.
67
Other states have passed narrower legislation and rules cover-
ing judicial records, 68 settlements with a governmental entity, 69
61 Attempts at federal legislative reform have been unsuccessful. 2 MICHAEL DORE, LAW
OF Toxic TORTS ch. 25, § 7, at 25-21 (1987 & Supp. 2002); see Luban, supra note 5, at 2651
(citing Senator Kohl's proposed Sunshine in Legislation Act, S. 374, 104th Cong. (1995), which
was voted down 51-49 in the Senate). See infra Part II.C. for a discussion of the bright-line
procedural rule newly adopted by the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina, the
first rule of its kind adopted by a federal court.
62 2 DORE, supra note 61, at 25-21.
63 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081(3) (West Supp. 2003).
-4 Id. § 69.081(4).
65 Dore, supra note 4, at 310.
66 TEX. R. Civ. P. § 76a(!), (2)(a)-(b) (Vernon Supp. 2002).
67 Id. § 76a(2)(a)(l), (b).
68 See, e.g., DEL. SUPER. CT. R. 9(bb) (2002) (requiring a judicial determination that good
cause exists for continued sealing of records); GA. UNIF. SUPER. CT. R. 21.1 (West 2003) (es-
tablishing procedural requirements for the sealing of judicial records); MICH. CT. R. 8.105(D)
(LEXIS 1998) (limiting court's discretion to seal any "documents and records of any nature that
are filed with the clerk"). For more state approaches, see Dore, supra note 4, at 314.
69 See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 132-1.3(a)-(b) (2001) (prohibiting agencies of the state gov-
ernment or its subdivisions from entering into confidential settlements except in a medical mal-
practice action against a hospital, and allowing a judge to seal government settlements only
upon the finding of an "overriding interest"); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.402(1) (2001) (prohibiting a
public body from entering into a confidential settlement).
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certain types of public hazards,70 and sharing of information in re-
lated litigation. 7' For example, New York Uniform Trial Court
Rule section 216.1 prohibits the sealing of court records filed with
the clerk except upon a written finding of good cause and the con-
sideration of the public interest. 72 The court is always required to
make an independent determination of good cause.7 3
2. The Federal Courts' Approaches
a. The Third Circuit
Judicially created rules vary across the federal circuits. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has a distinc-
tive rule, based on the common law, that presumptively grants
public access to anything actually filed with, and retained by, a
court, including settlement information.74 In Pansy v. Borough of
Stroudsburg,75 the Third Circuit reiterated that "a settlement
agreement deemed a judicial record is accessible under the right of
access doctrine," and that in such cases "the strong presumption of
access outweigh[s] the interest in promoting settlements.' 76 The
actual act of filing material with the court, or the incorporation of
the material into court proceedings, determines what is a judicial
record:
[W]hen a settlement agreement is not filed with the court, it
is not a judicial record for the purposes of the right of access
doctrine. . . .[If] the Settlement Agreement [has] not been
filed with, placed under seal, interpreted or enforced by the
district court, it [is] not a judicial record.77
70 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-122 (Michie Supp. 2001) (voiding settlement provisions
that restrict a person's right to disclose an environmental hazard); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4.24.611 (West Supp. 2003) (allowing the confidential settlement of product liability or haz-
ardous substance claims only when a court finds that such confidentiality is in the public inter-
est).
71 See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-420.01 (Michie 2000) (providing that protective orders is-
sued in personal injury or wrongful death cases shall not prohibit the sharing of discovery in
similar or related matters).
72 N.Y. UNIF. TRIAL CT. R. § 216.1 (2001).
71 In re Will of Hofmann, 727 N.Y.S.2d 84, 85 (App. Div. Ist Dep't 2001) ("Confidential-
ity is clearly the exception, not the rule, and the court is always required to make an independent
determination of good cause."); Danco Labs., Ltd. v. Chem. Works of Gedeon Richter, Ltd., 711
N.Y.S.2d 419, 425 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 2000) (holding that an order to seal court records
should rest on a sound basis or legitimate need to take judicial action and that the burden to
demonstrate such a need rests on the party seeking the sealing order).
74 Sobczak, supra note 7, at 410.
75 23 F.3d 772 (3d Cir. 1994).
76 Id. at 781.
77 Id. (quoting Enprotech Corp. v. Renda, 983 F.2d 17, 20 (3d Cir. 1993)); see also Cen-
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Because the Third Circuit "focus[es] on the technical question of
whether a document is physically on file with the court" to deter-
mine judicial record status,78 a court's entering of a confidentiality
order over documents does not render those documents "judicial
records" unless the documents are filed with the court.7 9 Addition-
ally, documents cease to be judicial records once they are no
longer part of the court file, such as in situations in which docu-
ments are returned to the parties.
80
In Pansy, the Third Circuit recognized that courts have "in-
herent power" to grant confidentiality orders over materials, in-
cluding settlement agreements, regardless of whether those materi-
als are contained in the court files, 8' but it criticized the practice of
automatically issuing confidentiality orders because the parties
agree to secrecy:
[S]imply because courts have the power to grant confidential-
ity does not mean that such orders may be granted arbitrarily.
Disturbingly, some courts routinely sign orders which con-
tain confidentiality clauses without considering the propriety
of such orders or the countervailing public interests which are
sacrificed by the orders. Because defendants request orders
of confidentiality as a condition of settlement, courts are will-
ing to grant these requests in an effort to facilitate settlement
without sufficiently inquiring into the potential public inter-
est in obtaining information concerning the settlement
agreement. 
82
dent Corp. v. Forbes, 260 F.3d 183, 192 (3d Cir. 2001) (applying the Pansy definition of judicial
records to attorney bids submitted to the district court); Jackson v. Del. River & Bay Auth., 224
F. Supp. 2d 834, 839 (D.N.J. 2002) (holding that a settlement agreement is not a judicial record
where it was never presented to the court or filed, interpreted, or enforced by the court, applying
the Pansy definition of judicial records).
It is interesting to note that in Pansy, the court quoted precedent indicating that in addition
to filing, a court must enforce an agreement before it is accessible to the public: "Moreover, the
Agreement will not become a part of the public record unless and until the district court may
order the parties to comply with its terms." Pansy, 23 F.3d at 781 (quoting Enprotech Corp. v.
Renda, 983 F.2d 17, 21 (3d Cir. 1993)). However, the Third Circuit later clearly stated in Cen-
dent Corp. that filing alone is enough to confer judicial record status. 260 F.3d at 192 ("The
status of a document as a 'judicial record,' in turn, depends on whether a document has been
filed with the court, or otherwise somehow incorporated or integrated into a district court's
adjudicatory proceedings.... [F]iling clearly establishes such status .... "). The district court
in Jackson also seemed to indicate that filing alone is sufficient. Jackson, 224 F. Supp. 2d at
839 ("Here, it is undisputed that this Court never filed, interpreted, or enforced the eventual
formal written settlement agreement. No tenet of law required the settlement agreement to be
filed with the court, and it was not.").
78 Pansy, 23 F.3d at 782.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 785.
92 Id. at 785-86.
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Instead, a court should balance several factors when determin-
ing whether "good cause" is shown and thus whether a confidenti-
ality order regarding settlement should be issued, including the
parties' interest in privacy, whether the information is sought for a
proper or improper purpose, whether the information at issue is
important to public health and safety, and whether a public official
is a party to the case. 83 Party reliance on confidentiality and a pub-
lic interest in encouraging settlement should not be given extra
weight in the balancing test as "settlements will be entered into in
most cases whether or not confidentiality can be maintained. 84
The court thus expressed the view that confidentiality is not essen-
tial for settlement.85
Overall, in the Third Circuit, a strong presumption of public
access to judicial records exists, and possible exceptional circum-
stances in which confidentiality may be appropriate are suggested
in the court's definition of balancing factors.86
b. The Seventh Circuit
The Third Circuit's focus on the actual filing of documents re-
lated to settlement, and therefore on the use of judicial resources,
as determining public accessibility to settlement information seems
87to be increasingly common. Recent cases in the Seventh Circuit
support this concept of public access. In Jessup v. Luther,88 a
magistrate judge presided over settlement discussions between a
former vice president of a public college and the college concern-
ing termination of employment. The magistrate "approved" the
parties' signed agreement, but did not issue a judicial order stating
his approval, which would have resulted in the magistrate judge's
retention of jurisdiction for later enforcement. Rather, he dis-
missed the suit with prejudice and sealed all documents related to
the settlement. 89 In deciding whether to grant an intervenor news-
paper's motion to unseal, Judge Posner first looked at whether the
settlement was a judicial record, stating that First Amendment and
public monitoring concerns create a strong presumption of public
83 Id. at 786-88.
84 Id. at 788 (quotations omitted).
85 Id. at 788, 790.
86 See Dore, supra note 4, at 316 ("While party reliance upon confidentiality and its 'par-
ticularized' importance in effecting settlement remain proper considerations, they are not dispo-
sitive, and must instead be weighted against a number of equally (if not more) important non-
party and public interests.").
87 FitzGerald, supra note 1, at 408.
88 277 F.3d 926 (7th Cir. 2002).
89 Id. at 927.
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access to such documents. 90 He then looked at whether the parties
stated a "compelling interest in secrecy," listing several situations
in which such a compelling interest in secrecy justifies the sealing
of portions of, and sometimes all of, a judicial record: in cases
containing trade secrets, informants, and children. 9' If such an in-
terest in secrecy exists, the interest is balanced against competing
interests on a case-by-case basis.92 In the case at issue, the magis-
trate did not retain jurisdiction over the case, and thus his sealing
order was no longer enforceable. Because "for some reason there
[was] a copy of the agreement in [the court's] files," and because
the parties did not present a compelling interest in secrecy, the
Seventh Circuit allowed access to the settlement information in the
court's possession.93 The court did note that the parties could have
kept the settlement information private by stipulating dismissal
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(ii) without filing
the settlement with the court.94
The Seventh Circuit applied the Jessup rules in Herrnreiter v.
Chicago Housing Authority,95 a case regarding employment dis-
crimination. An opinion by Judge Easterbrook held that the Chi-
cago Housing Authority relinquished any claim to confidentiality
when it made the enforcement of oral settlement terms the subject
of litigation. By asking the court to enforce the agreement, the
Housing Authority created a judicial record and thus opened the
terms of the agreement to the public.96 The court again recognized
a short list of limited situations in which confidentiality may still
be appropriate: cases involving trade secrets or national security
97issues. The Housing Authority's "desire to keep the amount of
90 Id. at 927-28.
9' Id. at 928.
92 Id. As a case-by-case balancing test is applied to each confidentiality situation, it is un-
clear whether the court intended its enumerated list of possible compelling interests to be ex-
haustive. See infra note 97 and accompanying text.
93 Jessup, 277 F.3d at 929-30.
9 Id. at 928. Rule 41(a)(l)(ii) states that an action may be dismissed without a court order
if the plaintiff files a stipulation of dismissal signed by all of the parties who have appeared in
the action. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(l)(ii); see infra note 248.
95 281 F.3d 634 (7th Cir. 2002).
9 Id. at 636-37; see also Coolsavings.com, Inc. v. Brightstreet.com, Inc., No. 99-C5499,
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4960, at *18-19 (N.D. 11. Mar. 25, 2002) (stating that, under Herrnre-
iter, if "the parties were unable to produce a mutually agreeable settlement instrument without
the Court's assistance, their agreement becomes part of the Court and, therefore, the public
record [regardless of the fact that] the parties have agreed that the settlement agreement should
remain confidential"); DeKalb Genetics Corp. v. Mycogen Plant Sci., Inc., 96 CV-50241, 2002
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23128, at *6-7 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 2, 2002) (denying intervenor motion to unseal
settlement agreements because the agreements were not filed with the court and thus were not
public documents; rather, they remained private contracts: "Put simply, the court cannot unseal
what it does not have.").
97 Herrnreiter, 281 F.3d at 637. As in Jessup, it is unclear whether the court intended its
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its payment quiet ... to avoid looking like an easy mark" was not
enough justification for confidentiality. 98 Again, the court stated
that the parties could have ended the appeal and kept the settle-
ment secret through stipulated dismissal. 99
However, in the more recent case Baxter International, Inc. v.
Abbott Laboratories, 10 the Seventh Circuit stated that this strong
presumption of access does not apply to appellate court records in
the same way that it applies to documents filed with a district
court, and thus confidentiality must be analyzed independently at
enumerated list of possible compelling interests to be exhaustive.
An exhaustive list of situations in which confidentiality may be appropriate on appeal was
seemingly enumerated later by the Seventh Circuit in Baxter Int'l, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 297
F.3d 544, 547 (7th Cir. 2002): "In civil litigation only trade secrets, information covered by a
recognized privilege (such as the attorney-client privilege), and information required by statute
to be maintained in confidence (such as the name of a minor victim of sexual assault), is entitled
to be kept secret on appeal." The Baxter opinion, written by Judge Easterbrook, cited the
court's earlier opinions in Jessup and Herrnreiter as supporting this rule. Id.
However, in an even more recent opinion of the Northern District of Illinois, Judge Posner
described the Jessup rules much more broadly:
Although documents submitted to a court are presumptively available for public
inspection in order to facilitate public monitoring of the courts, portions of docu-
ments that are shown to contain trade secrets, or other information that would cause
undue private or public harm if disclosed, as by invading personal property gratui-
tously, may be kept under seal.
SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Pentech Pharm., Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1008 (N.D. Ill.
2003) (citations omitted) (citing Jessup for both the presumption and exception portions of the
rule). In SmithKline Beecham, Judge Posner granted a motion to seal a portion of a patent-
related settlement between pharmaceutical companies based on concerns about unfair advantage
unrelated to trade secrets or any other subject enumerated in Baxter.
[The term "trade secret"] suggests an idea or inventions having commercial value
and reflecting investment by the firm seeking to maintain secrecy, such as a cus-
tomer list or a secret manufacturing process. There is nothing of that sort in the
[present] license agreement. The reason for secrecy is that it contains information
about terms and conditions of the distributorship arrangement that the licensing
agreement creates that might give other firms an unearned competitive advantage -
uneamed because the issue of public disclosure arises from the advantageous cir-
cumstance of the agreement's having become caught up in litigation and as a result
having become filed in the court.
Id. Judge Posner then found the information to be such that "the American public does not need
to know [it] in order to evaluate the handling of this litigation by the judiciary," and he accord-
ingly granted the motion to seal, Id.
98 Herrnreiter, 281 F.3d at 637.
99 Id. In the recent Northern District of Illinois case SmithKline Beecham, an opinion by
Judge Posner stated that when all parties sign a stipulation of dismissal, dismissal is automatic;
no judicial action is required, and neither the stipulation nor the settlement agreement need to be
submitted to the court. 261 F. Supp. at 1004. In SmithKline Beecham, however, one of three
parties refused to stipulate dismissal, and thus SmithKline filed a motion to dismiss under Rule
41(a)(2). Id. The opinion stated that the court did not have the authority to deny dismissal of
the suit between the stipulating parties, and the court would not have that authority even if it had
concerns that the settlement agreement was contrary to public policy or otherwise illegal, be-
cause when all parties stipulate dismissal under Rule 41(a)(l)(ii), the court does not have the
opportunity even to see the settlement agreement. Id. Rule 41 (a)(2) states that an action can be
dismissed upon order of the court, except where a defendant's counterclaim cannot remain
pending for independent jurisdiction. FED. R. CIv. P. 41(a)(2).
100297 F.3d 544 (7th Cir. 2002).
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the appellate level.10 1 The Seventh Circuit suggested that it would
be willing to return some documents to the trial court in order to
prevent inclusion in the appellate record and thus public disclo-
sure, including those filed in error and those that had little influ-
ence on any district court decision:
Another thing that the parties might have done is pared down
the appellate record. The strong presumption of public dis-
closure applies only to the materials that formed the basis of
the parties' dispute and the district court's resolution. If
documents have reached this court unnecessarily, the parties
could have asked us to send them back. The court sometimes
spontaneously orders documents returned in order to prevent
unwarranted disclosure of commercially sensitive informa-
.tion. Keeping the documents in the district court is an espe-
cially attractive option when they contribute little to the reso-
lution of the case yet are too voluminous to justify detailed
examination on appeal.10 2
Therefore, the act of physically filing a document with an ap-
pellate court may not preclude confidentiality as it does at the dis-
trict court level. As with the Third Circuit approach, the return of
documents may protect a document from public access. However,
information that is retained by the court and entered into the appel-
late record "normally is vital to the case's outcome" and is pre-
sumptively public. 0 3 The Baxter opinion thus includes in its con-
fidentiality analysis factors not included in Jessup and Herrnre-
iter - the materiality of documents to the claims brought, and the
extent to which the court in possession of the documents has relied
on the documents to make judicial decisions toward the resolution
of the claims. The consideration of these factors is based on the
argument that more judicial resources are expended on material
and influential documents, and that the public has a right to the
information necessary to evaluate the outcomes of such expendi-
tures: "How else are observers to know what the suit is about or
assess the judge's disposition of it? Not only the legislature but
101 Id. at 545-46.
102 Id. at 548. In contrast, in the district court case SmithKline Beecham, Judge Posner re-
fused to seal even redacted portions of the agreement that had been revealed to the public
through his opinion as "there the cat is out of the bag." 261 F. Supp. at 1004. Judge Posner did
not mention the Baxter case in the SmithKline Beecham opinion.
103 Baxter, 297 F.3d at 545. In Baxter, the parties were given an opportunity to amend
their motion to seal to include a detailed, reasoned, document-by-document argument for confi-
dentiality that included legal citations; the initial motion stated only that the parties had agreed
on secrecy and that the documents contained commercially sensitive information. Id. at 545,
548.
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also students of the judicial system are entitled to know what the
heavy financial subsidy of litigation is producing."104  It is not
clear, though, how these considerations should be weighed when
confidentiality is analyzed on the district court level in the Seventh
Circuit. Other courts have also considered these factors when con-
ducting a confidentiality analysis.
10 5
According to the Seventh Circuit in Jessup, and to its prog-
eny, settlement agreements filed with the court are subject to pub-
lic access absent a compelling interest in confidentiality. Parties
can avoid public access by avoiding judicial intervention and by
following the proper procedure to keep their settlement confiden-
tial.10 6 Parties' reliance on confidentiality is not weighed.
c. The Ninth Circuit
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has
rejected the idea that only certain types of information are appro-
priately kept confidential. In the recent product liability case Phil-
lips v. General Motors Corp.,'0 7 a magistrate judge ordered the
defendant car manufacturer to produce information about the total
number and aggregate dollar amount of previous settlements in-
volving fuel-fed fires and the type of pickup truck involved in the
case. At the defendant's request, the magistrate judge ordered the
production pursuant to a protective order to which the parties had
previously stipulated. The case later settled, after which the Los
Angeles Times moved to intervene and requested that the court un-
seal the exhibit containing the aggregate settlement information.
The district court permitted the unsealing, stating that the "narrow
issue" before the court when it decided whether to uphold the pro-
tective order was whether "information a party seeks to keep quiet
does not fall within the four corners of Rule 26(c)."'' 0 8 The district
'04 Id. at 546.
105 For example, the federal Bankruptcy Code generally mandates that all documents filed
in a bankruptcy case be available to the public, absent compelling circumstances. II U.S.C.
§ 107 (2000). A very recent bankruptcy opinion stated that, under this statute
[tihe criteria to be considered in determining whether confidentiality provisions
in settlements justify keeping the substance of such settlements from public access
must be flexible and vary according to the nature of the settlement and the specific
extent and core-ness of the impact of the settlement on the bankruptcy case.
In re Hemple, 295 B.R. 200, 202 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2003) (citing Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 893
(2d Cir. 1982) (requiring "an exercise of judgment" in light of "[tihe importance of the material
to the adjudication")). The court included in the factors that should be considered "the necessity
of the settlement to the viability of the bankruptcy case." Id.
106Jenny B. Davis, Case Opened: 7th Circuit Releases Sealed Settlement Agreement to
Newspaper, A.B.A. J. E-REP., Feb. 8, 2002, available at LEXIS, I ABA Journal eReport 5.
107 307 F.3d 1206, 1209 (9th Cir. 2002).
101 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(7). Rule 26(c)(7) grants a district court the power to "protect a
party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense" by
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court found that while the information covered under the stipulated
protective order was "the kind of information Rule 26(c) recog-
nizes as being legally protectable," the information at issue, aggre-
gate settlement amounts and averages, was not of the type listed in
the order. Additionally, the information did not deserve protection
independently due to the parties' needs and interests.' °9 The court
thus implied that only certain types of information can be subject
to a protective order." 0 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit corrected this
interpretation of Rule 26, stating that the law gives district courts
broad latitude to issue protective orders for all types of informa-
tion, including - but not limited to - those types of information
enumerated in Rule 26(c)(7), thus encompassing confidential set-
tlement information."'
Nor did the Ninth Circuit focus on the physical act of filing to
determine whether settlement information contained in discovery
materials is subject to public access. Prior to settlement in Phil-
lips, the original plaintiff, Phillips, filed a motion for discovery
sanctions because GM additionally included unrequested computa-
tions with the material turned over under seal as ordered by the
magistrate. Phillips attached a copy of the information about pre-
vious settlements to the motion for sanctions. The Ninth Circuit
stated that such filing does not determine public accessibility:
Although we understand the public policy reasons behind a
presumption of access to judicial documents (judicial ac-
countability, education about the judicial process, etc.), it
makes little sense to render the district court's protective or-
der useless simply because the plaintiffs attached a sealed
discovery document to a nondispositive sanctions motion
filed with the court." 2
The Ninth Circuit, however, expressly distinguished between
documents attached to a non-dispositive motion and those made
part of a dispositive motion such as a motion for summary judg-
ment. 1 3  Thus, like the Seventh Circuit approach in Baxter, the
making an order "that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial
information not be revealed or be revealed only in a designated way." Id.
109Phillips, 307 F.3d at 1211-12.
10 The Ninth Circuit identified these implications made by the district court. Id.
" Id. (citing Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984)).
121d. at 1213.
1131d. (citing Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 33 (1984); Rushford v. New
Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 252 (4th Cir. 1988) (stating that once sealed discovery
documents are made part of a dispositive motion, they "lose their status of being raw fruits of
discovery" (internal quotations omitted))). In the very recent case Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto
Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1135, the Ninth Circuit reiterated that the holding in Phillips was lim-
ited to materials filed with non-dispositive motions. The court explained this distinction:
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Ninth Circuit does consider the influence of the documents on ju-
dicial decisions and the importance of the materials to the vitality
and resolution of the claims to be important factors bearing on
confidentiality, at least in the discovery context."
4
Overall, the Ninth Circuit does not recognize either an ex-
haustive list of situations in which confidentiality may be appro-
priate or even a nonexclusive list of situations in which confidenti-
ality is likely appropriate. The Ninth Circuit does not consider the
physical act of filing to be determinative of access. The impor-
tance of a document to the resolution of the case may also be an
important factor in confidentiality analysis.
d. The Eleventh Circuit
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
has also indicated that, at least in the discovery context, filing does
not automatically result in public access; however, the court ap-
plies this conclusion even when a document is used by the court to
decide a dispositive motion. In Chicago Tribune Co. v. Bridge-
stone/Firestone, Inc., 115 various members of the media sought to
intervene after settlement of a defective tire case and requested the
unsealing of discovery documents sealed pursuant to Rule 26. The
defendant claimed that the documents contained trade secrets.",
6
Regarding the act of filing discovery materials, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit stated: "[W]here a party has sought the protection of Rule 26,
the fact that sealed material is subsequently submitted in connec-
tion with a substantive motion does not mean that the confidential-
ity imposed by Rule 26 is automatically forgone."
' 7
There are good reasons to distinguish between dispositive and non-dispositive mo-
tions. In Seattle Times, the Supreme Court noted that "of the information that sur-
faces during pretrial discovery may be unrelated, or only tangentially related, to the
underlying cause of action." The same cannot be said for materials attached to a
summary judgment motion because "summary judgment adjudicates substantive
rights and serves as a substitute for trial."
Id. at 1135-36 (citations to Seattle Times and Rushford omitted). For discovery materials at-
tached to a dispositive motion to be sealed, a party must show compelling reasons. Id.
14 Additionally, a recent Ninth Circuit dissenting opinion cited the Seventh Circuit opin-
ion in Herrnreiter for the rule, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42, that "parties do not
need an equitable decree from [a court] to accomplish the legitimate objective of dismissing this
appeal after having worked out a satisfactory settlement privately." N.W. Env't Advocates v.
U.S. EPA, No. 02-15826, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 16915, at *2 (9th Cir. Sept. 12, 2002).
'"3 263 F.3d 1304 (11 th Cir. 2001).
6 Id. at 1307-08. Unlike in Phillips, the documents were not identified as containing set-
tlement information. Id.
7Id. at 1313. This rule was recently restated by an Eleventh Circuit district court in Es-
tate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 184 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1365 (N.D. Ga. 2002)
(citing Chicago Tribune: "[T]he mere filing of certain documents with a court does not render
such material a matter of public record.").
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Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit stated that the stipulation of
the parties to a Rule 26 discovery protective order "replaces the
need to litigate the claim to protection document by document, and
postpones the necessary showing of 'good cause' . .. until the con-
fidential designation is challenged."'" 8  Agreed-upon discovery
documents are therefore presumptively confidential until chal-
lenged, but the court's final determination of confidentiality after a
challenge is not determined by the wishes of the parties.' 19 Absent
challenge, however, the Eleventh Circuit seems to grant the parties
power to determine what remains confidential and thus unavailable
to the public.
The court did state, however, that "[i]n certain narrow circum-
stances, the common-law right of access demands heightened scru-
tiny of a court's decision to conceal records from the public and
the media."'' 20  The court gave the example of a total sealing order,
in which a court seals an entire case record and therefore gives the
public the impression that the case never occurred.' 2' Though the
court quoted earlier cases in which a total seal was subject to
heightened scrutiny, 22 it determined that the present case was dis-
118 Chicago Tribune, 263 F.3d at 1307-08.
19 The district court in Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., stated that such presumptive con-
fidentiality "greatly facilitates discovery by encouraging full disclosure in reliance on assur-
ances of confidentiality." 184 F. Supp. 2d at 1362. However, parties "calling a document con-
fidential does not make it so in the eyes of the court; these consensual protective orders merely
delay the inevitable moment when the court will be called upon to determine whether Rule 26(c)
protection is deserved, a decision ultimately rooted in whether the proponent demonstrates
'good cause."' Id.
It is interesting to note that the district court in Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr. stated that
courts should require parties who stipulate discovery protective orders to specify a date upon
which the seal may be vacated, thus limiting the power to stipulate granted to parties in Chicago
Tribune. Id. at 1361. The district court also stated that a judge serves as the primary representa-
tive of the public in the judicial process and thus should not "rubber stamp" stipulations to seal
without considering the presumption of public access to public records. Id. at 1362-63 (quoting
Citizens First Nat'l Bank of Princeton v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 943, 945 (7th Cir. 1999)).
The court additionally stated that the fact that confidential material was already briefly
made available to the public due to an administrative error does not preclude a court mandate of
further confidentiality. Id. at 1364.
120 Chicago Tribune, 263 F.3d at 1311.
121 Id.; see also Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., 184 F. Supp. 2d at 1365-66 ("Neverthe-
less, even where the common-law right of access attaches, only in extraordinary circumstances
need the denial of such access be justified by a compelling interest," citing the Chicago Tribune
example of a total sealing order). The First Circuit has also implied in dicta that blanket sealing
orders require heightened consideration of the public interest in access; a blanket sealing order
should be granted only after "adequate consideration of the public interest in such access, re-
gardless whether the parties to the settlement agreement mutually supported the sealing or-
der. ... [W]e mention [the public interest issue] in order to flag the matter for consideration in
future cases." Picciotto v. Salem Suede, Inc. (In re Salem Suede, Inc.), 268 F.3d 42,45 (1st Cir.
2001).
122 Chicago Tribune, 263 F.3d at 1311 (quoting Wilson v. Am. Motors Corp., 759 F.2d
1568, 1571 (11th Cir. 1985) (citing Brown v. Advanced Eng'g, Inc., 960 F.2d 1013, 1015-16
(I Ith Cir. 1982))).
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tinguishable because the entire record was not sealed, and thus
such scrutiny was not required.1
23
The Eleventh Circuit also implied in Chicago Tribune that the
Rule 26(c)(7) list of situations in which discovery confidentiality
may be appropriate based on a good cause showing is exhaustive:
"Rule 26(c) permits a court upon motion of a party to make a pro-
tective order requiring 'that a trade secret or other confidential re-
search, development, or commercial information not be revealed or
be revealed only in a designated way."" 124 The court stated that
Rule 26 could apply in Chicago Tribune only if the documents at
issue indeed met the criteria the court had previously determined
were necessary for information to be considered a trade secret. 25
A concurring judge disagreed with the majority's restriction of
Rule 26 to only an enumerated list of document types: "In light of
the strong interest in having unimpeded discovery, third parties
may be barred from accessing documents even when the docu-
ments are not protected by a privilege (like the trade secret privi-
lege) .... ,,6
In summary, there is discrepancy across the jurisdictions re-
garding whether the act of filing a document, including a settle-
ment agreement, with a court is determinative of whether the pub-
lic has access to that document. Courts disagree as to the role
played by the parties' desire for, and agreement to, confidentiality,
and they disagree as to whether to consider a document's impor-
tance to the case and to judicial decisions. There is further dis-
crepancy regarding how to treat sensitive cases that are not enu-
merated by Rule 26, and whether and how certain types of materi-
als, such as those involving certain subject matter, are treated dif-
ferently or held to a different standard in confidentiality analysis.
II. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT SYSTEMS
One criticism of sunshine reforms is that courts rarely exer-
cise their discretion to prevent secret settlements. 2 7 Under sun-
shine laws, the ultimate decision to seal typically remains with the
court; thus, the public does not necessarily have access to settle-
ment information even when the public has an interest in the in-
formation. Research indeed indicates that judges in sunshine
states do not aggressively prohibit confidentiality and that toxic
123 Id.
1
24 Id. at 1313 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(7)).
12 Id. at 1313-14.
126 Id. at 1317 (Black, J., concurring).
127 Fromm, supra note 3, at 683, 690.
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tort cases continue to settle confidentially.128 Moreover, sunshine
laws simply do not apply to most cases, or even to all cases in
which the public has an interest, as the list of cases in which the
public has an interest is necessarily never comprehensive. 29 Even
where a sunshine statute or rule applies, the provision might not
apply to monetary settlement amounts (as in Texas). 130
Additionally, sunshine reforms that require access based on
enumerated subject matter may ignore the constitutional underpin-
nings of the right of access to judicial records. Even though a con-
stitutional right of access may not be directly enforceable, access
is arguably important for the informed discussion of the country's
affairs and for the development of respect for, and understanding
of, the legal system.' 3' The public may be entitled to a right of
access independent of the public's interest in given subject matter.
Alternatively, critics argue that sunshine reforms may require
a litigant to divulge too much information, including information
most people would agree should remain private. For example, a
litigant's AIDS status may be considered health and safety infor-
mation.1 32  Critics such as Arthur Miller argue that judges may
therefore compensate for litigants' loss of privacy by limiting dis-
covery, thus undermining the purpose of liberal discovery rules.
33
These critics argue that a presumption of openness generally un-
dervalues litigants' privacy by requiring consideration of the pub-
lic interest with every request of confidentiality, thereby assuming
that the public has an interest in all litigation.' 34 Though such ar-
guments directly address the discovery context, they can be made
regarding settlement situations as well.
David Luban defends sunshine regimes against some of these
privacy arguments by arguing that personal information such as
AIDS status would not be considered health and safety information
in which the general public has an interest. Additionally, a judge
could treat such a case as an exception even if the information is
thought to be of public importance. 35 Luban argues that there is
128 Id. at 690 (citing Dorothy J. Clarke, Court Secrecy and the Food and Drug Administra-
tion: A Regulatory Alternative to Restricting Secrecy Orders in Product Liability Litigation
Involving FDA-Regulated Products, 49 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 109, 121 (1994)).
129 Id. at 683.
130TEx. R. Civ. P. § 76a(2)(b) (Vernon Supp. 2002).
111 Bechamps, supra note 6, at 127; Sobczak, supra note 7, at 415.
132 Luban, supra note 5, at 2653-54 (identifying and refuting this argument).
13-1 Miller, supra note 21, at 476-77; see also Luban, supra note 5, at 2653-54 (identifying
and refuting Miller's argument).
114 Miller, supra note 21, at 467; see also Epstein, supra note 23 ("Secret settlements allow
both parties to get on with their lives by preserving privacy interests - say, the confidentiality of
medical records - that, if anything, receive greater respect today than ever before.").
135 Luban, supra note 5, at 2654.
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no reason to believe that judges will limit discovery in response to
sunshine reforms, especially because sunshine reforms change the
presumption that discovery information is private, and thus the
reforms should alter a judge's perception of what is public and pri-
vate information.' 36 Again, these defenses of sunshine regimes can
be applied to the settlement context.
Other important factors, such as judicial economy, may simi-
larly be neglected by sunshine regimes. 37 Miller argues that most
cases are complex, technical, or merely involve the application of
well-established principles of law to current fact patterns, and
these types of cases do not generate any information in which the
public has an interest.' 38 He argues that sunshine reforms therefore
impose an unnecessary burden on the courts. 139  Perhaps even
worse, due to the technical and commercial nature of many cases,
the reforms create an unnecessary risk of invasion of privacy or
even the unconstitutional taking of information that is considered
property. Approaches that allow public access to litigation materi-
als may violate a litigant's right to the exclusive use of private
property, such as research and development information or finan-
cial information.1 40  Again, while Miller makes these arguments
regarding discovery, settlement information could also potentially
reveal these types of information, especially financial information.
Another major argument against sunshine reforms is that se-
cret settlements may be the only way that a weak plaintiff can ob-
tain compensation, and it is similarly argued that sunshine reforms
will result in lower settlement amounts because plaintiffs will not
be compensated for confidentiality. Without the possibility of se-
crecy, plaintiffs may not receive settlement offers and cases must
go to trial, which is a costly process plaintiffs may not be able to
afford.'4' Luban defends sunshine reforms by arguing that defen-
dants will still have the standard incentives to settle, and even a
non-confidential settlement may be less likely to lead to headlines
than would a trial. 142 Judge Jack Weinstein, however, does ac-
knowledge that rules limiting confidentiality may make it harder
for plaintiffs to settle because such rules "inject a wild card into
1361d. at 2655.
131 Sobczak, supra note 7, at 415.
3 Miller, supra note 21, at 467; see also Epstein, supra note 23 (arguing that some vehi-
cles in the Firestone/Ford litigation were pushed beyond their performance limits in extreme
conditions and that such misuse is often overlooked in liability cases).
'.9 Miller, supra note 21, at 467.
1 'Old. at 467-74.
141 Luban, supra note 5, at 2657 (identifying and refuting these arguments).142 Id.
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the settlement game."'143 Weinstein recognizes the risk that reduc-
ing confidentiality may discourage people, such as those in re-
search and design, from expressing concerns in writing about
things that implicate public health - thus possibly creating a larger
danger to society.144
A criticism of the Third Circuit approach to settlement confi-
dentiality, which consists of a strong presumption of public access
based on the physical act of filing documents with a court, is that
such a rule "makes virtually all complex settlements 'public' set-
tlements because they will, by necessity, require some minimal
level of court involvement."'' 45 The practical concern of retaining
jurisdiction for later enforcement requires filing of the settlement
agreement; many settlements, like those that resolve class action
cases, require judicial approval.146 Privacy is not respected in such
a system because privacy is in effect very difficult to obtain.
Another criticism of the Third Circuit approach is that it limits
or grants access to court documents based on the label "judicial
record" rather than on the information contained in the documents.
Additionally, it is problematic that the trial court does not exercise
discretion over documents and their subject matter until after the
documents actually become public records, and ad hoc rules are
then used to limit access retrospectively based on whether or not a
document is labeled a judicial record. 47 Anne-Therese Bechamps
argues that "[a] system that limits access to court documents not on
the basis of the information they contain, but on the basis of the label
they bear, is not conducive to the goals of confidence, understanding,
and respect" for the legal system. An "ad hoc approach to defining
the scope of the common law right belies the spirit of the right"
and "projects an image of secrecy and distorted truth around what
should be an open judicial system."'' 48 However, Bechamps' criti-
cism was written before the Pansy decision. In Pansy, the Third
Circuit defined balancing factors that a court may use to determine
if judicial records should be sealed, including whether "a settle-
ment agreement involves issues or parties of a public nature."'
149
143 Weinstein, supra note 29, at 60-61; Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort
Litigation, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 469, 516 (1994) (Weinstein's Secrecy in Civil Trials: Some Ten-
tative Views, 9 J.L. & POL'Y 53, 59 (2000), supra note 29, is a more recent version of this 1994
piece.).
144 Weinstein, supra note 29, at 60; Weinstein, supra note 143, at 516.
145 FitzGerald, supra note 1, at 409.
'
46 Id. FED R. CIv. P. 23(e) mandates that "[a] class action shall not be dismissed or com-
promised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise
shall be given to all members of the class in such a manner as the court directs."
147 Bechamps, supra note 6, at 124-25.
1
48 Id.
,49 Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 786-88 (3d Cir. 1994).
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The consideration of this factor may reduce the seemingly arbi-
trary nature of making confidentiality decisions based on the label
of "judicial record" because it allows subject matter to be taken
into account. However, the lack of predictability that such a bal-
ancing test may create may continue to perpetuate images of se-
crecy and distortion of the truth.
Such balancing since Pansy is still only conducted regarding
documents that are filed with the court, though, so an argument
may still exist that under the Third Circuit approach, parties and
judges can avoid disclosing information that is obviously of public
nature by not filing such information with the court, such as by
filing a voluntary stipulation of dismissal without filing the actual
settlement terms. It can be argued that such information should be
released to the public regardless of whether a court is involved due
to the public interest in certain types of information, such as that
pertaining to public health and safety, as is recognized by some
sunshine laws. 1
50
Approaches that grant a trial judge the discretion to balance
factors and then decide whether to limit or grant public access may
result in inconsistent and unpredictable outcomes, which is a tradi-
tional argument against balancing tests and in favor of bright-line
rules. First, judges may not be detached decision-makers regard-
ing settlement confidentiality as they may have already formed
attitudes about the parties and may have already encouraged or
assisted in settlement. Thus, the judge would not be capable of
adequately representing the public interest in access to the settle-
ment information. 151
Second, judges are often given nothing more than a general
list of factors to balance, and thus they are not provided enough
guidance regarding the balancing process to reach consistent re-
sults. 152 Additionally, by giving judges a number of factors and
interests to consider, balancing approaches give judges a broad
range of choices that may force the judges to make policy deci-
sions that the legislature may be more competent to make.
53
Again, such a system permits inconsistent results. Similar prob-
lems occur with rules that give judges only an unspecified stan-
150 E.g., TEX. R. CIv. P. § 76a(2)(b) (Vernon Supp. 2002) (including within court records
"settlement agreements not filed of record ... that seek to restrict disclosure of information
concerning matters that have a probable adverse effect upon the general public health or
safety").
1SI Bechamps, supra note 6, at 139.
1
5 2
1d. at 143, 156.
'531 d. at 143.
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dard, such as "good cause," that a litigant must meet to gain access
or to maintain secrecy.154
Even if a judge is able to discern what interests are involved
in a case, a balancing test may force judges to balance incompara-
ble interests. 55  The public interest in disclosure is balanced
against an individual's right to privacy, and judges are given little
guidance regarding how to weigh these seemingly distinct inter-
ests. Again, such a policy decision may be best left to the politi-
cally accountable legislature.
56
A problem identified with the Seventh Circuit's approach to
settlement confidentiality is that the options available to parties
who want to keep their agreements confidential are limited. First,
parties wanting confidentiality can file with the court and seek a
confidentiality order. In Jessup, the Seventh Circuit identified rea-
sons that parties may seek judicial involvement, such as later en-
forcement and the desire to have a "neutral third party . . . look
over the settlement agreement and note any ambiguities or other
flaws.' 5 7 However, with any judicial involvement the settlement
becomes a judicial record, and thus there is no guarantee that the
information will remain under seal, even if a sealing is ordered as
it was by the magistrate in Jessup.'58 Alternatively, to avoid any
risk of public access, the parties can keep the settlement agreement
private and pursue an action for breach if disclosure occurs. How-
ever, "changed circumstances may make continued confidentiality
no longer in a party's interest, so there may be a perceived reason
to disclose. If terms of an agreement are revealed and a breach
action brought, proving damages can be a problem unless the
agreement provides for liquidated damages."'' 5 9  Thus, parties
wanting confidentiality do not face easy decisions.
154 See, e.g., D. MASS. LOCAL CT. R. 7.2(a) (West 2002) ("Whenever a party files a motion
to impound, the motion shall contain a statement of the earliest date on which the impounding
order may be lifted, or a statement, supported by good cause, that the material should be im-
pounded until further order of the court.").
155 Bechamps, supra note 6, at 143-44.
561Id. Such an argument assumes that a legislature can be sufficiently specific in making
the policy judgment so that the decision can be applied by courts without the use of unrestrained
judicial discretion.
157 Jessup v. Luther, 277 F.3d 926, 929 (7th Cir. 2002).
158 Id. at 927.
'
59 Law and Motion: Jessup v. Luther, FED. LITIGATOR, Mar. 2002, at 61, available at WL
17 Fed. Litigator 61.
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III. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
A. Ethical Rules
Richard Zitrin proposes an ethical rule as the solution to the
secret settlement problem.' 6° Zitrin argues that lawyers on both
sides of a case actively participate in the cover-up of public infor-
mation by creating secret agreements, and they justify the agree-
ments as being required by "zealous advocacy."' 16 1 Zitrin argues
that court rules and legislation do not provide the best solution for
several reasons. First, legislation is more difficult to draft than
ethical rules. 162 Second, such top-down approaches are often based
on insufficient information: Legislatures rarely have the best in-
formation about what is happening in the courts; appellate courts
do not necessarily know what is happening in everyday litigation;
and even trial courts only learn about secrecy when they are pre-
sented with stipulations and motions.163 Zitrin claims that legisla-
tion and court rules necessarily contain appropriate exceptions, and
a lawyer's historical duty to his or her client - as well as state eth-
ics rules reinforcing the primacy of that duty - will cause lawyers
to argue that any present case is an exception. As judges face
crowded dockets, a lawyer arguing that a case does not fall under
the public law has an excellent chance of winning the argument.'
64
Zitrin proposes a standard of disclosure that does not limit
confidentiality at all, but rather ensures that lawyers cannot con-
tract away their ability to disclose known dangers to the public.1
65
With an ethical rule, "[i]nstead of lawyers feeling, as they do un-
der the current rules, the chilling effect on their duties to the client
should they refuse to secretize information, they will feel the chill-
ing effect of the prohibition against putting the public in danger
where the damages to the client are minimal."'' 66 Zitrin's most re-
cent proposal reads:
16wZitrin, supra note 13, at 1. Zitrin proposed a model rule of professional conduct at the
Hofstra University School of Law Conference on Legal Ethics: Access to Justice (Spring 1998),
and his rules have been twice considered and rejected by the ABA Committee on Evaluation of
the Rules of Professional Conduct. Id. at 1, 18, 19. For more detail, see Richard Zitrin, The
Case Against Secret Settlements (Or, What You Don't Know Can Hurt You), 2 J. INST. FOR
STUDY OF LEGAL ETHICS 115 (1999).
161 Zitrin, supra note 13, at 19.




'66 Id. at 20.
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A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making an
agreement among parties to a dispute, whether in connection
with a lawsuit or otherwise, to prevent or restrict the avail-
ability to the public of information that [the lawyer reasona-
bly believes] [a reasonable lawyer would believe] directly
concerns a substantial danger to the public health or safety, or
to the health or safety of any particular individual[s].167
Zitrin compares such a rule to those that limit client confidential-
ity, which have been adopted in most states, such as rules allowing
disclosure where a client intends to commit a crime likely to result
in death or great bodily injury.168 Such rules tip the balance in fa-
vor of a lawyer's ability to protect society as opposed to a lawyer's
duty to protect client confidences.
In addition to clarifying the standards and procedures courts
should use when sealing records, Anne-Therese Bechamps also
wants to "redefine the lawyer-client relationship" through rules of
professional conduct. 169 Bechamps argues that an attorney's right
under the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct to withdraw
from representing a client if the "client insists upon pursuing an
objective that the lawyer considers repugnant or imprudent, or if
withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect
on the interests of the client" is inadequate because a sealing order
may not rise to this high standard.170 She asserts that an effective
remedy would be "to create and protect a sphere of moral auton-
omy in which lawyers would 'align themselves more with the
courts and their peers and less with their clients."",17' She states
that a more immediate solution, however, would be for lawyers
and clients to engage in a dialogue regarding community values
such as fairness, especially in cases that involve public interest.
Lawyers and clients should discuss the ethical implications of con-
fidentiality and explore solutions that do not adversely impact the
public. 172  Judge Jack Weinstein likewise believes that attorney
167 Id. app. A (brackets in original) (Proposed Model Rule 3.2(B), presented to ABA
Committee on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, Feb. 2001).
Im6Id. at 19.
169 Bechamps, supra note 6, at 155.
170 d. (citing ABA MODEL RULE OF PROF'L CONDUCT L.16(b)(3) (1987), current version
at ABA MODEL RULE OF PROF'L CONDUCT 1. 16(b)(4) (2002)).
171 Bechamps, supra note 6, at 155-56 (quoting Frederick A. Elliston, Ethics, Professional-
ism and the Practice of Law, 16 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 529, 546 (1985)).
172 Bechamps, supra note 6, at 156-57; see also Frances Komoroske, Should You Keep Set-
tlements Secret? Not If You Can Help It, TRIAL, June 1999, at 55, 56-57 (publication of the
Association of Trial Lawyers of America) ("It is important that this issue [of secrecy] be dis-
cussed with the client going into the case. The client should be educated about the benefits to
the public, including plaintiff's family and friends, of not signing a confidentiality agreement.").
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ethical obligations to inform the public are at least a partial solu-
tion. 173
B. Balancing Tests
Laurie Dore proposes that courts use a balancing test to de-
termine when consensual secrecy should be upheld, and the factors
to be balanced and the weights to be given depend on the stage of
litigation at which confidentiality is requested. 7 4 Dore defines a
distinct mix of balancing factors for three different confidentiality
contexts: stipulated protective orders regarding discovery, the seal-
ing of judicial records, and confidential settlements.175 Her ap-
proach focuses on whether particular access achieves the underly-
ing objectives of public access - to facilitate public monitoring of
the judicial system, to enhance public confidence in the system, to
educate the public, and to ensure fair and accurate fact-finding. 
76
In regard to the sealing of settlement terms, Dore argues that
litigants do not file terms of settlement with the court unless they
want the court to take later action; thus, filed settlements relate to
judicial decision making and should be subject to a presumption of
access. 177 That presumption is weak, however, because settlements
do not present the court with an issue of substantive rights; as a
result, party reliance upon the sealing order and the importance of
confidentiality in achieving the settlement may overcome the pre-
sumption of access. 178 Ultimately, the public and private interests
implicated by the settlement must be balanced, and judicial discre-
tion is necessary.179 For example, the public has a particular inter-
est in the use of government funds and in settlements that involve
and bind a government entity.1
80
The public, however, generally should not have an interest in
settlements between private parties. Even though settlement in-
formation may help other parties assess the merits of their argu-
ments, it does not directly advance the adjudication of other
cases.18' Dore argues that in most private cases, public policy fa-
voring resolution can justify settlement confidentiality, unless an
unusual or compelling need for public access is present. 82 Thus, a
173 Weinstein, supra note 29, at60; Weinstein, supra note 143, at 514.
174 Dore, supra note 4, at 286.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 402.
177 Id. at 394.
178 Id. at 395.
17 9 Id. at 395, 402.
"'01d. at 397-98.
18 1 Id. at 398.
'
82 Id. at 399.
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court has little authority to make a private settlement public if the
litigants stipulate dismissal. 183 Overall, Dore's test favors the al-
lowance of confidentiality in settlements. Dore only addresses
settlements filed with a court.
Brian FitzGerald argues that the balancing test used to deter-
mine settlement confidentiality should use the same standards that
should be used with total sealing orders, though he does not define
what factors should be balanced.184 FitzGerald argues that the ex-
isting tests used with the sealing of pretrial discovery materials
should not be applied to the total sealing and settlement contexts
because the latter two situations involve a judicial act at the adju-
dicative stage. 115 Because the public enjoys a strong common law
presumption in favor of access to judicial proceedings, as well as
some level of a First Amendment right of access, total sealing or-
ders must overcome that strong presumption.186 FitzGerald argues
that sealing settlement agreements that have been filed with the
court raises similar concerns.'
8 7
FitzGerald claims that courts have indeed recognized that the
public has a stronger right of access regarding public documents
than with discovery, and have thus applied variations of a "good
cause plus" standard to total sealing orders. In the absence of Su-
preme Court guidance, courts have added an unarticulated "plus"
or extra showing to the "good cause" standard used with discovery
documents in Seattle Times; however, the "plus" necessary for
sealing remains unclear. 88  FitzGerald argues that the discovery
"good cause" standard should not be used, but that a new and sig-
nificantly heightened balancing test for the total sealing and set-
tlement contexts should be created by reweighing the factors used
in "good cause" determination. FitzGerald states that no one
bright-line rule will suffice for courts to determine when sealing is
appropriate and necessary. 189 However, he declines to enumerate
183Id. at 401.
184 FitzGerald, supra note I, at 410.
185 Id. at 394. The idea that a different and more heightened standard should be used with
total sealing orders is supported by the Eleventh Circuit in Chi. Tribune Co. v. Bridge-
stone/Firestone, Inc., 263 F.3d 1304, 1311 (11th Cir. 2001); the First Circuit in Picciotto v.
Salem Suede, Inc. (In re Salem Suede, Inc.), 268 F.3d 42, 45 (Ist Cir. 2001); and the Northern
District of Georgia in Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr. v. CBS, Inc., 184 F. Supp. 2d 1353,
1366-67 (N.D. Ga. 2002); see supra notes 121-23.
'
86 FitzGerald, supra note 1, at 392, 395.
187 Id. at 405.
188 Id. at 392, 393 n.58 (citing Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 883 (2d Cir. 1982) (requiring an
"exercise of judgment" in addition to good cause when sealing materials from the adjudication
stage), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1071
(3d Cir. 1984) (requiring the party seeking the hearing to show that the material is the "kind of
information that courts will protect")).
'
89FitzGerald, supra note 1, at 411.
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the factors that should be balanced, acknowledging that "[tihe de-
velopment of a standard for granting secrecy will not be easy" and
stating only that the new balancing test must "address[] the unique
common law and First Amendment concerns raised by the sealing
of public records."' 90 FitzGerald, like Dore, only addresses set-
tlements that have been filed with the court.
Sharon Sobczak asserts that a balancing test should be applied
to the total sealing order context, and she does define what factors
a judge should consider.' 9' If one adopts FitzGerald's argument
that total sealing orders and confidential settlements should be
treated similarly, Sobczak's factors may similarly be applied to
confidential settlements filed with the court. Unlike Dore's test,
Sobczak's test generally favors public access. Sobczak defines
five elements, the first of which is the nature and magnitude of the
harm to the parties that will result if confidentiality is not al-
lowed. 192 More weight should be given to possible money damage
than to damage to one's reputation. 93 Litigants should have to
show, with some evidentiary support, high probability that the
harm will occur, and the court should attempt to find analogous
cases to determine if the occurrence of harm is indeed likely.'94
The judge should also consider the type of case and the parties in-
volved. For example, public officials should be protected against
mere curiosity about matters that have no relation to their public
lives. 95  Second, the court should support confidentiality only
when it is certain that there is no less restrictive way of protecting
the parties' interests, such as the sealing of only certain documents
or the use of initials or pseudonyms. 196
On the side of the balance favoring access, the court should
consider the public's interest in having the record remain open., 97
The public should have a strong presumption of access to public
records, especially those involving judicial action, and the parties
190Id. at 411-12.
"9' Sobczak, supra note 7, at 415-16.
1
92 Id. at 416.
193 Id.
1941 d. at 416-17.
1
9 5 Id. at 416. However, in defamation cases, the Supreme Court has suggested that a wide
range of issues are relevant to the assessment of an official's fitness for office. E.g., Oscala
Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295, 300 (1971) (holding that plaintiff, as the city mayor
and as candidate for county tax assessor, was a public official and that a charge that he had been
indicted for perjury in a civil rights suit was relevant because "a charge of criminal conduct
against an official or a candidate, no matter how remote in time or place, is always 'relevant to
his fitness for office"').
96Sobczak, supra note 7, at 417. For a recent analysis of the use of litigant anonymity,
see Babak Rastgoufard, Note, Pay Attention to That Green Curtain: Anonymity and the Courts,
53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1009 (2003).
1
97 Sobczak, supra note 7, at 417.
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seeking sealing should bear a heavy burden of showing harm be-
fore sealing is even considered. 98 While the public does not gen-
erally have more than a general interest when only pleadings have
been filed, public interest should be given more weight when the
pleadings contain information that may contain public health or
safety information. 199 The judge has the ultimate role of deciding
whether documents will be useful to future litigants and thus what
the public interest is.
200
Another factor judges should consider is whether the public
has alternative means of obtaining the information at issue, such as
through an administrative agency - a factor that is especially im-
portant when a judge has doubts about whether public interest in
the information even exists.2 ' The final factor that should be con-
sidered is the stage of the proceeding. 2 2 The further into the pro-
ceeding, the more judicial action has occurred and the more time
has been spent and expense incurred; as such, the presumption in
favor of public access should be stronger. °3 Overall, Sobczak's
test makes it difficult for parties to achieve confidentiality.
Judge Jack Weinstein too believes that a balancing test is nec-
essary to determine the appropriateness of secrecy, and he argues
that judicial discretion is necessary in the application of that test.204
He lists generally the factors that should be balanced: "the inter-
ests of the parties in keeping the information confidential against
the interests of the public in publishing it ... the interests of liti-
gants in other suits, the needs of regulatory agencies to have access
to information, concerns of public interest groups, and the interests
of future plaintiffs.2 z 5  In cases concerning sociopolitical prob-
lems and in mass tort cases, public interest is especially strong.2°
Weinstein argues that, in general, secrecy should be rejected
whenever there is doubt as to whether it is appropriate.20 7
C. Bright-Line Approaches
Anne-Therese Bechamps argues that a bright-line approach is
preferable over a balancing approach to secret settlements for sev-





201 Id. at 418.
202 Id.
203 Id.
204 Weinstein, supra note 29, at 61; Weinstein, supra note 143, at 516.
205 Weinstein, supra note 29, at 58; Weinstein, supra note 143, at 513.
2
06 Weinstein, supra note 29, at 57-58; Weinstein, supra note 143, at 511-13.
207 Weinstein, supra note 29, at 65.
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ments better left to the legislature; 208 by giving judges a choice of
many outcomes, balancing tests leave room for inconsistent out-
comes and therefore reduce confidence in the legal system;2°9 and
balancing tests may force a judge to weigh incomparable interests,
such as privacy and access to public records.21° She advocates the
application of a bright-line common law right of access to settle-
ments filed with the court, with some exceptions based on subject
matter.2
Bechamps suggests a model statute that identifies six situa-
tions in which individual privacy rights may outweigh the public's
common law right of access:
(1) All documents filed with the court are public records and
available for inspection unless access is limited by stat-
ute or by court order entered according to the procedures
set forth below.
(2) Upon the entry of a final judgment or consent decree, any
party to a civil action may move to seal specific docu-
ments or portions thereof contained in the court records.
(3) Before limiting access to court records, the court shall
give notice to all parties and interested third parties and
shall hold a hearing on the motion. The court shall not
seal court records except upon finding that the moving
party has proved by clear and convincing evidence that
information contained in the document sought to be
sealed:
(a) constitutes a trade secret or other confidential com-
mercial research or information;
(b) is a matter of national security;
(c) promotes scandal or defamation;
(d) pertains to wholly private family matters, such as di-
vorce, child custody, or adoption;
(e) poses a serious threat of harassment, exploitation,
physical intrusion, or other particularized harm to
the parties to the action; or
(f) poses the potential for harm to third persons not par-
ties to the litigation.
208 Bechamps, supra note 6, at 143-44.
209 Id. at 124.
210 ld. at 143-44.
211 Id. at 118-19, 124.
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(4) The sealing order shall specify the documents to be
sealed, the reasons for sealing, and the duration of the
order.21 2
Bechamps states that the situations involving trade secrets and
commercial information, national security, and scandal or defama-
tion, are well-recognized exceptions to the common law right of
access.213 She states that the threat of harassment or other particu-
larized harm "protects privacy when the public has little interest in
the controversy and is supported by the constitutional right to pri-
vacy that the Supreme Court has recognized in certain family mat-
,,214ters. She states that the exceptions also allow the court to pro-
tect parties from theft, exploitation, and other intrusion, especially
in cases in which the settlement amount is large.21 5 The final ex-
ception, involving harm to third parties, protects third parties who
have not availed themselves of the adjudication process, but who
may become subjects of scrutiny as a result of public access to set-
tlement information, such as in a situation where bank records are
revealed. 1 6 Bechamps's overall approach is to make cases avail-
able to the public "to the extent that parties take advantage of court
processes to resolve their dispute," as the public is entitled to
21know how court resources are utilized. '7
The U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina re-
cently became the first federal district in the nation to adopt a
bright-line rule making any settlement filed with the court a public
record.218 Local Civil Rule 5.03 outlines the procedure a litigant
must follow to submit a motion to seal documents, and it contains
a provision under which public notice must be provided by the
clerk of the court. 219 Newly adopted subsection C reads: "No set-
tlement agreement filed with the court shall be sealed pursuant to
the terms of this Rule. 220  Parties can still achieve confidential
settlements by not filing their agreements with the court. 221 Local
2I21d. at 144-46.
213 Id. at 145-46.
2141d. at 146 (citing Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Moore v. City
of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438 (1972)).
215 Bechamps, supra note 6, at 146.
2 16 Id
.
217 Id. at 156.
218 South Carolina Federal Judges Adopt Rule Banning Secret Settlements, PROD. LIAB.
ADVISOR, Nov. 2002, at 7, available at WL 165 PLADVISORY 7; South Carolina: Federal
Judges Ban Confidential Settlements, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale), Nov. 8, 2002, at 3A.
219 D.S.C. LOCAL CIV. R. 5.03(A)-(B) (Law. Co-op Supp. 2002).
220D.S.C. LOCAL CIV. R. 5.03(C) (Law. Co-op Supp. 2002) (effective Nov. 1, 2002),
available at http://www.scd.uscourts.gov/Notices/LR503.pdf.
221 Local Civil Rule 5.03 states: "Nothing in this Rule limits the ability of the parties, by
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rules may retain a provision allowing settlements to be kept secret
by judicial discretion if there is no public interest in the case, 222
though it has also been reported that no exception exists for the
settlement of cases that reveal sensitive information. 2 3
Richard Epstein argues against the South Carolina rule, claim-
ing that "the major problem today is not too many secret settle-
ments but too much litigation - and public settlements may only
reinforce the underlying unsoundness of the tort system., 224 When
information obtained by one plaintiff is available to others, the
cost of litigation is reduced and more suits may result, and plain-
tiffs may be encouraged to file suits against defendants who settle
once.225 When plaintiffs target a defendant, such as a medical fa-
cility, insurance rates for other facilities will increase, which may
prevent important public services and new (and potentially safer)
products from being provided or developed. 26 Additionally, set-
tlement disclosure may increase the time it takes plaintiffs to re-
ceive their money because defendants are likely to try to postpone
settlement in an effort to prevent public access to case informa-
tion.227 Overall, Epstein argues that the South Carolina amend-
ment is too drastic because public disclosure does not necessarily
serve the public interest, and he argues that "marginal and consci-
entious adjustments in existing practice" should instead be
made.228 He does not propose any specific changes. Others who
oppose the rule have listed situations in which privacy should be
permitted, including malpractice cases in which the plaintiffs want
to keep their medical conditions private, molestation or sexual har-
agreement, to restrict access to documents which are not filed with the Court." It is estimated
that 75% of all civil cases in South Carolina are settled out of court. S.C. Seeks to Ban Secret
Settlements, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2002, at IA [hereinafter S.C. Seeks to Ban].
222 South Carolina Federal District Court Proposes to Cease Sealing Settlements, 71 U.S.
L. WK. 2085, 2085 (2002) (quoting Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson, Jr.). Local Civil Rule 1.02
provides that any local rule can be overridden by the court for good cause in a particular case.
D.S.C. LOCAL Civ. R. 1.02 (Law. Co-op Supp. 2002). The South Carolina Defense Trial Attor-
neys Association argues that if the court retains discretion to overrule subsection C in any case,
then the subsection is unnecessary and without effect. Comment to Proposed Amendment to
Local Rule 5.03, S.C. DEF. TRIAL ATr'Ys ASS'N, Sept. 10, 2002, at http://www.lfcj.com/
articles/display.asp?artnum=79 [hereinafter Comment to Proposed Amendment].
223 South Carolina: Federal Judges Ban Confidential Settlements, supra note 218 (citing a
wire report source); S.C. Seeks to Ban, supra note 221 (citing the Associated Press).
224 Epstein, supra note 23; see also South Carolina: Federal Judges Ban Confidential Set-
tlements, supra note 218; Comment to Proposed Amendment, supra note 221 ("[Tlhe proposed
amendment to Local Rule 5.03 will not address the perceived problems arising from the use of
confidential settlement agreements, but instead, may ultimately foster litigation by virtue of
potential Plaintiffs being encouraged by reports of 'big money settlements."').
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assment cases in which the plaintiffs want to keep their identity
private, and certain cases involving trade secrets or proprietary
information. 2 9
Supporters of the new South Carolina rule believe that it will
cause public hazards, such as faulty products, to be discovered
more quickly.23 °  South Carolina Chief Justice Jean Toal does not
believe that the rule will burden the courts with more cases. Based
on her discussions with chief justices of other jurisdictions with
open settlement rules, Toal says that those jurisdictions do not
have backlog problems due to such rules and that "it just uncom-
plicates things to have [secrecy] taken off the table as a negotiating
tactic. 23'
In California, a bright-line approach to secret settlements was
considered by the state legislature in 200 1,232 but it failed to
pass.233  Like sunshine reforms, the proposed legislation enumer-
ated types of cases that cannot be settled confidentially, regardless
of whether the agreement is filed with the court. Assembly Bill 36
and Senate Bill 11, which were identical, covered any lawsuit
229 S.C. Seeks to Ban, supra note 221 (quoting Dr. R. Duren Johnson, Jr., president of the
South Carolina Medical Association and Mills Gallivan, president of South Carolina Defense
Trial Attorneys' Association); Comment to Proposed Amendment, supra note 222.
230 S.C. Seeks to Ban, supra note 221; Rebecca E. Epstein, Comment on August 1, 2002
Proposed Local Rule 5.03 Amendment, TRIAL LAW. FOR PUB. JUST., Sept. 19, 2002, available
at http://www.tlpj.org/briefs/comments secrecy_091902.htm.
231 S.C. Takes Lead in Opening Lawsuit Settlements to the Public View, THE FREEDOM FO-
RUM, FIRST AMENDMENT, Sept. 23, 2002 (citing the Associated Press), at http://www.freedom
forum.org/templates/document.asp?documentlD= 17000.
South Carolina's state courts were expected to follow the federal district's lead. South
Carolina: Federal Judges Ban Confidential Settlements, supra note 218 (citing South Carolina
Chief Justice [Jean Toal]); 60 Minutes 1I, supra note 16 (Internet coverage of the Jan. 15, 2003,
lead story on 60 Minutes II with Dan Rather, citing Chief Justice Toal). Indeed, proposed South
Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 38 stated that "[n]o settlement agreement filed with the court
shall be sealed pursuant to this Rule." Proposed S.C. R. Civ. P. 38 (proposed 2003), available
at http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/whatsnew/Rule%2038%20SCRCP.htm (last visited Oct. 2,
2003). However, Rule 38 received significant criticism, especially from representatives of
doctors and insurance companies, who anticipated that increased settlement and insurance costs
would be passed on to consumers. Jeffrey Collins, High Court to Discuss Secret Settlement
Ban, AUGUSTA CHRON., (Jan. 22, 2003), online edition, at http://www.augustachronicle.comV
stories/012203/met_ 124-1025.shtml (citing the Associated Press). Instead, Rule 41.1 was en-
acted, which does not prohibit courts from approving secret settlements, but rather requires a
court to balance enumerated factors before deciding to seal an approved settlement. S.C. R.
Civ. P. 41.1(c) (effective May 5, 2003), available at 2003 S.C. LEXIS 108. These factors are:
the public or professional significance of the lawsuit; the perceived harm to the parties from
disclosure; the alternatives available to protect the interests of the parties; and the impact of
sealing on the public interest, including health and safety. In family law cases, the court is
required to additionally consider the presence of private financial information and sensitive
custody issues. Id. Rule 41.1 does prohibit courts from approving confidential settlements that
"involve a public body or institution." Id.
232 A.B. 36, 2001-02 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2001); S.B. 11, 2001-02 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2001).
233 Nancy Vogel, Foes Jab at Davis over Bill Signings, Died in the Legislature, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 16, 2001, at BI.
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based upon harm allegedly "caused by a defective product, finan-
cial fraud, unfair insurance claims practice, or environmental haz-
ard. 234 The bills stated that information contained in settlement
agreements or acquired through discovery "concerning" the enu-
merated subjects "shall be presumed to be public information and
may not be kept confidential pursuant to an agreement of the par-
ties.2 35 Agreements that restrict a party from disclosing such in-
formation would be void and unenforceable.236 A provision of the
legislation would have allowed trade secrets to remain confiden-
tial. 237 The bills followed and expanded upon the 2000 adoption of
California Rule of Court 243.1, which makes all trial court re-
cords, including settlements filed with a court, presumably open
unless there is an "overriding interest that overcomes the right of
public access to the record.2 38
Opponents of the California legislation argued that the pro-
posed blanket legislation ignored the need to balance the public
interest in the search for truth with litigants' privacy interests.239
Opponents also argued that because what is considered a "trade
secret" can be narrowly construed, the legislation would put busi-
nesses in the state at risk of disclosure of intellectual and informa-
tional property and competitive information. 240 They also claimed
that confidential settlements do not hide problems because allega-
tions about a business's misdeeds are already in the public record,
and because many plaintiffs' attorneys conduct press conferences
when claims are made. Since confidential settlements are made
for reasons other than culpability, settlement information does not
provide any additional evidence of actual public hazards.24'
234A.B. 36 § 2 (proposed CODE CIv. P. § 188(a)); S.B. 11 § 2 (proposed CODE CIV. P.
§ 188(a)).235 A.B. 36 § 2 (proposed CODE CIv. P. § 188(b)); S.B. II § 2 (proposed CODE CIv. P.
§ 188(b)).
236 A.B. 36 § 2 (proposed CODE CIV. P. § 188(c)); S.B. I I § 2 (proposed CODE CIV. P.
§ 188(c)).
237 A.B. 36 § 2 (proposed CODE CIv. P. § 188(b)(1)); S.B. I I § 2 (proposed CODE CIV. P.
§ 188(b)(I)).
238 CAL. R. CT. 243.1 (West Supp. 2003) (adopted Oct. 27, 2000). Additionally, the Rule
requires that "[tihe overriding interest supports sealing the record"; "[a] substantial probability
exists that the overriding interest will be prejudiced if the record is not sealed"; "[tihe proposed
sealing is narrowly tailored"; and "[n]o less restrictive means exist to achieve the overriding
interest." Id.
239David H. Martin, Protecting the Integrity of Discovery, L.A. LAW., Mar. 24, 2001, at
92.
240 Michael K. Brown & Lisa M. Baird, Businesses' Privacy and Property Rights Threat-
ened in California, ANDREWS TIRE DEFECT LITIO. REP., April 2001, at 1I.
241 Id.
It is interesting to note that a recent anti-secrecy bill signed into law in California takes a
more moderate approach than the defeated bills, allowing a court to take potential prejudice to
parties into account. Assembly Bill 634, signed into law on August 28, 2003, prohibits a court
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IV. A MORE APPROPRIATE SOLUTION
In analyzing confidentiality, settlements should not be sub-
jected to the same "good cause" standard and balancing test as are
discovery documents because of the public's different levels of
interest in different stages of a proceeding. The public's level of
interest and resulting amount of access should increase as a pro-
ceeding advances due to the different levels of access allowed his-
torically and to the increasing level of judicial involvement and
use of resources that has occurred by later stages. The test that
should be applied to settlements does need to be clearly articu-
lated. In general, a middle ground should be found among the so-
lutions already suggested to the secret settlement problem.
A. Which Settlements Should Be Covered
The first question that must be answered in formulating a so-
lution to the settlement secrecy problem is which settlements a
242
new rule should cover. Jurisdictions like the Third Circuit and
the Seventh Circuit focus on the filing of documents to determine
what classifies as a judicial record and thus to what the public
should have access. Some jurisdictions with sunshine-type re-
forms do not confine their treatment of secret settlements to judi-
cial records, but instead enumerate subject matter that is covered
by a rule regardless of whether it is filed with a court.
A settlement is generally a private agreement between parties,
and in order to preserve the historical right to contract freely,
courts and legislatures should be reluctant to intrude upon a set-
tlement unless a party asks that a court somehow be involved.243
Parties should generally be permitted to receive or give considera-
tion in exchange for silence if they so choose.
from recognizing or enforcing confidential agreements regarding violations of California's elder
abuse law absent a showing that the information is otherwise privileged, the information is not
evidence of the abuse of an elder, or there is "a substantial probability that prejudice will result
from the disclosure and that the party's interest in the information cannot be adequately pro-
tected through redaction." A.B. 634 § 1, 2003-04 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003) (proposed CODE CIV.
P. § 2031.1).
242 "Rule" is used loosely here to refer to a court rule, piece of legislation, and/or other
means of addressing which settlements should be publicly accessible.
243 Regarding this historical right to contract, Harry Jones stressed:
[T]he deeply ingrained power that the idea of contract has had, throughout recorded
history, on the minds of men and women; the centrality of contract as a basic institu-
tion of contemporary society; and the significance of freedom of contract as one of
the great 'constitutional' devices for the dispersion of power in a society fearful, as
ours has always and rightly been, of the concentration of too much power in too few
hands.
Harry W. Jones, The Jurisprudence of Contracts, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 43,44 (1975).
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If a rule-making body does want to make settlements in which
a court has no involvement publicly accessible, a bright-line com-
ponent to a settlement solution is always necessary because, if no
court is involved in a settlement situation at any point, there is no
appropriate governmental or other oversight body to analyze
whether public access is appropriate based on the facts of the
situation. A bright-line rule that prohibits all settlements or gener-
alized settlements based on enumerated traits, such as those con-
taining certain subject matter, from being confidential is neces-
244
sary.
The problem with applying bright-line rules to cases in which
a court is not involved is that those rules fail to recognize that
every factual situation is different, even across cases containing
similar subject matter. Thus, before it is required that the public
have access to settlement information, the settlement should be
analyzed by a competent body that has the discretion to disallow
access if it is inappropriate. For example, even a plaintiff in a
seemingly "standard" product liability case that does not contain
sensitive health information may have legitimate reasons for
shielding a settlement from the public. As a perhaps extreme ex-
ample, a plaintiff may need to avoid a disturbed or even dangerous
former acquaintance. Settlement information may reveal specifi-
cally or generally where the plaintiff lives through the listing of
the plaintiff's address or even because the settlement is with a lo-
calized business; the public disclosure of such information may be
enough to put her in danger. Such a plaintiff could not settle with
a manufacturer and maintain privacy if products liability cases re-
sult in a type of settlement that must be made public according to a
bright-line rule.
Additionally, in order to provide much public protection, such
bright-line rules that cover enumerated settlements in which a
court is not involved can only define the covered settlements gen-
erally and broadly; there is no authority to assess what "gray"
cases are covered within the enumerated categories. If a narrow
definition of covered settlements is used in a bright-line rule, set-
tlements that truly contain information important to the public
likely will not fall under the definition and therefore will not be
disclosed, rendering the confidentiality rule ineffective. However,
broad definitions, such as general subject areas, conversely cause
cases that are not important to the public to be revealed. Parties
are then prevented from negotiating a confidentiality provision that
they should rightly be able to utilize, and litigants' privacy is vio-
244 E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081 (West Supp. 2003).
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LA W REVIEW
lated without satisfying a public interest as contemplated by the
rule-maker.
Therefore, due to the necessity of using problematic bright-
line rules to encompass cases in which a court is not involved,
court involvement should be necessary before settlement informa-
tion is required to be available to the public. The court would then
be able to exercise its discretion to prevent access where it is inap-
propriate, so as not to unnecessarily infringe upon the litigants'
right to contract.
The next concern is how or to what extent a court must be in-
volved in a settlement before the court is permitted to determine
that public access is necessary. In formulating a solution to the
settlement secrecy problem, it must be decided whether the re-
quired judicial inquiry into access should apply only to settlements
with terms that are actually on file with the court. Under the status
quo, a court will sometimes address or approve a settlement gener-
ally without having the specific terms filed. Additionally, most
jurisdictions, such as the Seventh Circuit, allow parties in a case to
avoid public disclosure of a settlement by filing a stipulated dis-
missal without filing the terms of the settlement with the court,
even where the court is aware of the settlement.245 Some jurisdic-
tions, such as the Seventh Circuit and the Ninth Circuit, consider
the materiality of documents to the claims brought and the extent
to which the court has relied on settlement information to make
substantive judicial decisions when deciding whether information
filed with the court is public record, such as by distinguishing be-
tween the court's use of settlement information to make a disposi-
tive or non-dispositive decision.246
Once a court uses resources by addressing a settlement, the
public should have a right of access to information about that set-
tlement, including its terms. Whether or not a judge used the set-
tlement to make substantive or dispositive decisions should have
no bearing on this rule as judicial resources are used any time a
court considers a settlement. Additionally, determining whether a
settlement influenced certain court decisions and how to categorize
those decisions would be difficult and would require further re-
sources. Thus, a secret settlement rule should apply not only to
settlements with terms filed voluntarily by the parties, but also to
settlements that a court addresses or references for any reason.
Procedural rules should mandate that the court can address and
245E.g., Jessup v. Luther, 277 F.3d 926, 928 (7th Cir. 2002).
246 E.g., Baxter Int'l, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 297 F.3d 544, 545-46 (7th Cir. 2002); Phillips v.
Gen. Motor Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1213 (9th Cir. 2002).
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reference a settlement only if the terms of the settlement are on
file, and the content of the settlement would then be subject to
public accessibility analysis by that court. For example, filing
would be required when a court references a settlement in its order
of dismissal. The filing of terms should not result in automatic
access, though, but should prompt a case-by-case analysis as de-
scribed below.
The question arises whether it is then necessary for a court to
reference a settlement in an order of dismissal if settlement is in-
deed the reason behind the court order. Arguably, a court could
help parties circumvent this proposed filing requirement by dis-
missing a case without reference to the settlement. This act could
facilitate settlement and dismissal in cases in which the parties de-
sire secrecy. For purposes of appeal, though, a court must often
articulate the reasons for a final order, 47 and courts should addi-
tionally be required to mention a settlement in good faith when the
settlement is a reason for dismissal. A judge concerned about the
public interest would certainly want to make such a mention so
that the terms of the settlement would be filed and subject to pub-
lic access if appropriate. Additionally, a court would somehow
learn of the settlement before it orders dismissal, be it through the
receipt of a motion for dismissal or through a hearing, and the
court should reference the settlement at some point in this process.
Such a reference to the settlement would trigger the proposed fil-
ing requirement as well. While arguably the court may not have
expended resources toward the development of the terms of the
settlement in such a situation, it has expended resources and acted
based on the existence of the settlement; therefore, the settlement
is of public interest.
It also may be argued then that under this proposed filing re-
quirement there is no way for parties to settle without court in-
volvement once a complaint has been filed as there is no way to
avoid the court from somehow addressing or referencing the set-
tlement. Consequently, there is no way to avoid filing settlement
terms. Some might assert that such an outcome is inappropriate
because parties who file complaints ask that the court to judicially
resolve the case, not that the court be involved should resolution
occur through private settlement. As most parties will not settle a
247 E.g., FED R. Civ. P. 52(a) ("In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law
thereon .... "); Principe v. Ukropina (In re Pac. Enters. Sec. Litig.), 47 F.3d 373, 377 (9th Cir.
1995) ("We hold that in a [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 23.1 [shareholder] derivative ac-
tion, a district court that does not respond to objections [to a settlement] with findings of fact
and conclusions of law must provide a reasoned response elsewhere in the record.").
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case before they know how rigorously the other side will pursue
their interests, the filing of a complaint is often necessary to trig-
ger settlement. Once the existence of a settlement is made known
to a court, though, the filing requirement would apply.
However, the plaintiff would retain the right under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 41 to voluntarily dismiss the action, and
all the parties could stipulate to dismissal without any mention of
the settlement. 248  If a court has not addressed or referenced the
settlement prior to this point, the settlement would not need to be
filed with the court. Due to the public interest in the use of judi-
cial resources, however, it would be inappropriate for a court to
spend resources being apprised of a settlement without requiring
that the settlement be filed. For example, if the parties mention
the existence of a settlement in a meeting in chambers, the judge
would need to acknowledge any discussion about that settlement
and order the parties to file its terms pursuant to the court rule re-
quiring the filing of all settlements that a court addresses or refer-
ences. 249  It would be inappropriate, therefore, for a court to find
out that a settlement agreement exists and to allow the parties to
stipulate to dismissal to avoid filing.
These methods of dismissal may seem like easy ways to avoid
the filing requirements, and thus seem to be techniques that will
undermine any confidentiality analysis based on the filing of set-
tlement terms. Still, many parties will want to involve the court in
the settlement process to secure judicial approval of terms and to
retain the court's jurisdiction. Parties who have considerably
fewer resources and less experience than their opponents, a dis-
crepancy often seen in product liability cases, may be reluctant to
settle the case without at least some mention of the settlement to
the experienced and neutral judge.
248 FED. R. Civ. P. 41 (a)(I)(i)-(ii). Rule 41 (a)(l)(i) provides that a plaintiff can voluntarily
dismiss an action without court order "at any time before service by the adverse party of an
answer or of a motion for summary judgment, whichever occurs first." Some courts, however,
have not allowed voluntary dismissal even within this time limit if the merits of the case have
been addressed. See Harvey Aluminum, Inc. v Am. Cyanamid Co., 203 F.2d 105, 107-08 (2d
Cir. 1953) (denying dismissal when a hearing had been held on plaintiffs request for a prelimi-
nary injunction, which was denied based on the merits of the case, and when the defendants had
conducted significant preparation). But see D.C. Elecs., Inc. v. Nartron Corp., 511 F.2d 294,
298 (6th Cir. 1975) (stating that Rule 41(a)(l)(i) clearly does not allow judges to use discretion
to create exceptions to the time limit). Rule 41(a)(l)(ii) does not provide any time limit for
stipulation of dismissal by all parties. See also supra notes 94, 99 and accompanying text; su-
pra note 114.
249 However, if parties merely express the desire to enter into settlement negotiations in-
stead of the existence of an agreement, no court order under the procedural rule would be ap-
propriate. It is hard to imagine a situation, however, where the parties would stipulate to dis-
missal on the mere hope that settlement negotiations will prove fruitful.
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B. Confidentiality or Accessibility as the Default
The next question in formulating a rule regarding settlement
secrecy is whether it should generally be presumed that parties can
settle confidentially, or whether it should be presumed that the
public has access to all settlement information filed with a court.
Jurisdictions such as Third Circuit strongly presume public access
to filed settlements, 250 and Anne-Therese Bechamps, for example,
proposes legislation that presumes access to filed settlements and
enumerates when privacy should be allowed . 51 Jurisdictions such
as the Eleventh Circuit presume confidentiality if the parties agree
to it, at least in the discovery context,252 and critics such as Arthur
Miller and Richard Epstein argue that confidentiality is crucial to
the achievement of settlement and the preservation of litigants'
rights.253 The latter is the better approach. A rule should allow
confidentiality as a default and use a test to determine when access
is appropriate, not the other way around. Litigant privacy should
be the primary interest protected due to the right to contract freely,
to the traditional role of dispute resolution as the primary function
of civil courts, and to the importance of confidentiality to settle-
ment facilitation and litigants' rights. Dissemination of informa-
tion to the public is a mere secondary effect of the current system
and thus is an improper primary aim for the courts, though public
interest should certainly always be considered in confidentiality
analysis.
As confidentiality is so crucial, it should not be automatically
prohibited in any settlement situation, as occurs with bright-line
rules that enumerate which subject matters cannot be settled confi-
dentially.254 Settlement confidentiality is widely considered cru-
cial to the settlement of many cases, and arguments stating that the
elimination of confidentiality, either for all cases or enumerated
cases, or the creation of an extremely high standard for the grant-
ing of confidentiality, will not affect settlement rates and amounts
are not convincing. Deep-pocketed defendants will not be as
likely to settle without the benefit of confidentiality; indeed, they
may choose to go to court in the hope of clearing their name,
rather than settle and have the notified public assume wrongdo-
ings. Since it is widely accepted that many cases settle, and that
2
m E.g., Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 781 (3d Cir. 1994).
251 Bechamps, supra note 6, at 118-19, 124.
252 E.g., Chi. Tribune Co. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 263 F.3d 1304, 1307-08 (11 th Cir.
2001) (granting the parties, absent challenge, the power to determine what discovery material
remains confidential and thus unavailable to the public).
253 Miller, supra note 21, at 463-77; Epstein, supra note 23.
254 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081 (West Supp. 2003).
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many of those cases settle confidentially, it is not a stretch to as-
sume that eliminating much confidentiality will cause courts to
have to deal with more cases, many of which will be complicated,
publicized, or both.
While more cases will need to be resolved through the courts
if confidentiality is eliminated, plaintiffs in sensitive cases who
want confidentiality will be discouraged from utilizing the court
system to seek justice if it is guaranteed that personal information
will become readily available to the public. Without the feasible
option of using the courts to achieve justice or even to enforce
their out-of-court settlements, plaintiffs in sensitive cases who de-
sire confidentiality, but who are involved in a situation in which
confidentiality is prohibited, will have absolutely no recourse
against a defendant who is unwilling to settle or is unwilling to
carry out agreed-upon settlement terms.
Therefore, the allowance of confidentiality should be a gen-
eral default, and the possibility of confidentiality should not be
automatically removed for any type of settlement.
C. Balancing vs. Bright-Line Tests
Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit has opined that in
legal situations with recurrent factual patterns, bright-line rules are
appropriate so that people are able to determine the legality of
their actions before they act:
A legal approach calling on judges to examine all of the
facts, and balance them, avoids formulating a rule of deci-
sion. . . . People are entitled to know the legal rules before
they act, and only the most compelling reason should lead a
court to announce an approach under which no one can know
where he stands until litigation has been completed ...
[W]e should be able to attach legal consequences to recurrent
factual patterns. 5
However, since so many cases of so many types settle, it is
difficult - if not impossible - to break down cases that settle into
discrete categories and to formulate absolute bright-line rules for
those types of cases. Gray area necessarily exists with any cate-
gory definition. Due to this gray area, some cases will defy cate-
gorization, fall into several categories, or inadvertently be wrongly
categorized - thus causing inappropriate rules to be applied to
25 5 Sec'y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1539 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J., con-
curring) (arguing that a bright-line rule should be used to determine if the Fair Labor Standards
Act applies to migrant farm workers).
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cases. Even if categories could be well defined, a bright-line rule
is still not appropriate. Even within a seemingly well-defined gen-
eral type of settlement, such as products liability settlements, facts
differ too much to make a bright-line test appropriate and fair for
all the cases even in this category.
For example, even if most product liability cases contain in-
formation from which the public would benefit, fact patterns do
exist where settlement information would provide no such public
benefit. A product may no longer be widely in use, and thus the
public may not greatly benefit from the settlement information,
while potentially private information about the plaintiff's product
use and injury may be revealed. A product may have been used
extremely incorrectly or unusually, and thus settlement informa-
tion again would not benefit the public.256 Additionally, some
cases are frivolous and without merit, but defendants may settle
anyway rather than give the plaintiff further attention and use addi-
tional resources, and again this settlement information would not
be useful. The public, however, is likely to view any settlement as
evidence of defendant culpability, and the public may therefore
erroneously think a danger exists where it does not. The public
may then be reluctant to use a potentially beneficial product, and a
defendant manufacturer may suffer financial harm and injury to its
reputation for no reason. While these examples of situations that
create misleading settlement information may not represent the
majority of product liability cases, even a few potential instances
of undesirable confidentiality outcomes is sufficient to at least
show that a bright-line approach to general types of cases is inap-
propriate. In cases in which the public would not benefit from set-
tlement information, a party should have the opportunity to argue
that the party's interest in confidentiality outweighs public interest
in the information, and a court should be able to grant confidential-
ity.
Using a general bright-line approach, but granting the court
some discretion or recognizing a court's inherent power to over-
ride that bright line may seem like a step in the right direction. But
such an approach does not explicitly define what a judge must
consider in determining whether a case falls within an exception.
Thus the same problems of inconsistency and inappropriate judi-
cial policy decisions arise as they do with a generally applied but
ill-defined balancing test. Additionally, even if exceptions to the
216 Epstein, supra note 23 (arguing that some vehicles in the Firestone/Ford litigation were
pushed beyond their performance limits in extreme conditions and that such misuse is often
overlooked in liability cases).
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bright-line rule are well defined, such an approach undervalues
litigants' right to privacy as that right is only assessed in excep-
tional cases and even then is typically presumed to be weak or
nonexistent.
A balancing approach is more appropriate when deciding
whether the public should have access to settlement information.
A blanket, across-the-board balancing test for all types of settle-
ments is not appropriate, though, due to the unique public interest
in certain types of cases. For the same reasons that many courts,
legislatures, and scholars want to enumerate certain situations in
which confidentiality should never be allowed, it is necessary to
apply a different balancing test to some cases. Courts and settle-
ment confidentiality have been discussed for many years, and
courts, legislatures, and scholars repeatedly identify the same fact
patterns as problematic - especially mass torts and product liabil-
ity cases and sexual abuse cases.
However, due to the difficulty of concretely defining such
categories and to the possibility of factual situations in which a
litigant's interest in privacy outweighs the public interest in ac-
cess, judicial discretion remains necessary, and a bright-line rule
even for the enumerated categories is not appropriate. A better
rule enumerates cases that are held to a heightened standard in
which balancing factors are weighed differently and by which it is
easier for the public to gain access. A balancing test that presumes
a strong litigant interest in confidentiality should be applied to all
other cases, by which public access is more difficult to obtain. As
confidentiality would be allowed in most cases, the confidentiality
that is so important in our legal system would not be greatly re-
duced, and few people would be discouraged from using the legal
system.
D. Differences Between the Two Tests Proposed
Two related but distinct balancing tests should be used by
courts to determine when public access to settlement information
is appropriate - one that is applied to settlements containing cer-
tain enumerated subjects and one that is applied to all other settle-
ments. The two tests can even require consideration of the same
factors, but the tests need to provide different weights for those
factors depending on the type of case at issue.
This proposed rule recognizes the importance of confidential-
ity overall and treats confidentiality as an overall default by not
prohibiting confidential settlements for any case and by requiring
judicial consideration of each settlement and its involved interests
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on a case-by-case basis. However, the two balancing tests should
start with different presumptions. The majority of settlements,
those that do not pertain to enumerated subjects, should carry a
strong presumption against access and thereby weigh litigants'
privacy interests heavily. This general, standard test would be ap-
plied to most cases and thus would allow confidentiality most of
the time. The balancing test that would be applied to the smaller
number of settlements involving enumerated subjects, however,
initially should weigh public interest more heavily than privacy
interests. This test that is applied to settlements involving special
circumstances still must require a case-specific balancing, and thus
the privacy interests of individual litigants must always be consid-
ered. Even when applying the test to be applied to special circum-
stances, a judge would retain discretion to override the presump-
tion of access in any particular case.
The presumptions for the two tests should be strong, which
reduces the predictability problem that Easterbrook and others
identify as resulting from balancing tests. Confidentiality will
generally be allowed for most settlements, absent a very strong
public interest, and confidentiality will not generally be allowed
for settlements containing enumerated subject matter, absent a
very strong litigant interest in privacy. It can be argued that the
judicial discretion that must be exercised when applying any bal-
ancing test makes the use of two different tests unnecessary be-
cause a judge could effectively apply a presumption of access to
every case (or a presumption of privacy, depending on the stance
of the critic). However, the use of a strong presumption deter-
mined by the classification into relatively easy-to-recognize cate-
gories, along with the use of a defined balancing test, makes it
unlikely that judges will apply the tests erratically. Additionally,
many legal rules can be overcome by judicial discretion,257 and
many legal tests require balancing; such rules are applied without
the judicial discretion resulting in widespread problems. Applying
the discretion argument to this proposed rule is no different than
applying it to balancing tests generally. The appeals process also
would protect litigants and the public from any occasional gross
error on the part of judges who conduct the balancing.
Additionally, as required by Bechamps' model legislation,258
any sealing order should specify the documents to be sealed, the
reasons for sealing, and the duration of the order. Likewise, an
order denying a motion to seal shall specify the reasons for not
257E.g., D.S.C. LOCAL Civ. R. 1.02 (Law. Co-op Supp. 2002).258Bechamps, supra note 6, at 144-46.
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sealing. Requiring a judge to explain his or her balancing process,
and to explain the nature and the relative importance of the spe-
cific interests involved, will also reduce erratic, judge-specific
confidentiality decisions by holding judges accountable. It will
enable judges to make their decisions more consistent with those
made in other cases and by other judges because decisions and
processes can be compared in detail. Providing such detail will
also make it possible (at least theoretically) for all people to re-
search the decisions made in similar cases and to therefore predict
a legal outcome before they act.
The question arises whether any court analysis should be re-
quired when a settlement is filed and the parties do not object to
public access. Parties may want to stipulate access in order to
avoid the time and cost of addressing the appropriate balancing
factors when confidentiality is of no personal importance to them.
As litigants' right to contract should be respected, and as some
public right of access to our judiciary system has been recognized
and has been viewed as necessary to the system, 59 such agree-
ments to access should generally be honored and should eliminate
the need for much of the in-depth case-by-case analysis required
by this rule. It should generally be the job of the parties involved
to seek confidentiality, and in doing so, to argue when public ac-
cess would not be beneficial or would be misleading. Confidenti-
ality should not be at issue if no such arguments are made. A
court should not generally analyze confidentiality sua sponte, but
the court should retain the discretion to do so if extreme circum-
stances arise in which confidentiality seems very necessary despite
the lack of party arguments in favor of secrecy. If, for example,
settlement information would likely stop the public from using a
beneficial product or access would likely harm a vulnerable party
such as a minor, the judge may be prompted to analyze the desir-
ability of access; however, it is difficult to imagine such a situation
arising in which an original party or another interested intervenor
would not seek confidentiality by its own motion. Therefore, a
judge should look over an agreement of access to make sure an
extreme need for confidentiality does not exist, and the judge
should make some written indication as to the reason why confi-
dentiality was not further considered. Overall, when a settlement
is filed, a court will carefully analyze the need for public access
only if a party objects to such access.
While it may be argued that it will be burdensome to the
courts to require the application of a balancing test and the devel-
259See supra notes 36-53 and accompanying text.
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opment of a written explanation for every settlement that involves
a court in which confidentiality is sought, the use of strong pre-
sumptions should make balancing easier and quicker, and access to
the explanations made in past cases and by other judges should
prevent a judge from having to "reinvent the wheel" with every
settlement. Even so, it may be argued that the application of even
an easy balancing test will be burdensome for the courts due to the
requirement that parties file, and courts balance, every settlement
in which confidentiality is an issue and in which the court is in-
volved or addresses. As so many cases settle after a court has be-
come involved in some way, such as after the filing of a complaint,
the requirement will encompass a great number of settlements.
Once judicial resources have been expended on a case,
though, a prohibitive amount of additional resources will not be
required for the court to do the additional balancing required by
this rule, especially if a judge is already familiar with the case. A
hearing may not even be necessary as a judge can require parties to
file briefs addressing the relevant balancing factors at the time set-
tlement terms are filed with the court, if confidentiality has been
requested by that point, or at the point when confidentiality be-
comes an issue. A ruling can then be made based on motions and
on the paper record. Parties will not likely even seek confidential-
ity unless they have a strong interest in such secrecy due to the
cost of addressing the balancing test even through written briefs;
as explained above, few judicial resources will be used if parties
do not object to public access. As many filed settlements will not
require judicial confidentiality analysis for the simple reason that
the parties do not seek secrecy, the burden on the courts created by
the proposed rule will not be prohibitive. Additionally, judicial
resources are often used even with bright-line rules to determine
how and whether a fact situation falls under the test.
In looking at the bigger picture, courts would not be required
to apply the proposed balancing tests to settlements that are not
filed either voluntarily by the parties or as required due to some
court involvement in, or reference to, the settlement. Where the
tests are applied, the application of a more uniform and predictable
confidentiality test may reduce the number of appeals and remands
based on confidentiality, and thus may reduce the burden on the
judicial system overall. The application of a predictable confiden-
tiality test may make it more likely that parties concerned about
confidentiality will negotiate and comply with settlements without
utilizing the courts because those parties will better be able to pre-
dict what a judicial outcome regarding confidentiality would be.
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
There will be less reason to go to court regarding confidentiality
due to the narrowing of the opportunity to try to talk a judge into
granting anomalous results not clearly prescribed by the proposed
tests.
E. Special Enumerated Types of Settlements
The public has a particularly strong interest in cases concern-
ing national security, government entities or representatives, prod-
uct liability and mass torts, sexual violence and predation, and
substantial threats to public health and safety. While gray areas
exist within these categories, especially regarding national secu-
rity, judges would retain the discretion to decide which settlements
fall into the enumerated categories. Jurisdictions and scholars
seem generally to accept these categories and consider them rea-
sonably easy to recognize and apply. Although this list necessarily
cannot encompass all settlements in which the public has an inter-
est and should have access, under the rule proposed in this Note,
public interest is considered and weighed even with settlements
that do not involve enumerated subjects.26 ° Settlements that are
not enumerated, cases that fall into gray areas, and cases that are
incorrectly considered to be enumerated or not enumerated will not
be subject to an inappropriate bright-line rule.
F. Factors to Balance and Weights to Assign
Although it does recognize a weak presumption in favor of
access, Laurie Dore's test generally favors confidentiality and is
thus an appropriate model for the proposed general balancing test
to be used with most settlements in which confidentiality is
sought.26' Similar to Dore's test, the proposed balancing test for
most settlements recognizes the possibility of access in all situa-
tions by requiring case-by-case balancing, but the proposed test
has a strong presumption in favor of confidentiality. In support of
confidentiality, a judge should strongly weigh party reliance upon
the sealing order, the importance of confidentiality in achieving
the settlement, and any harm that may result to the parties if confi-
dentiality is not allowed, including both monetary and reputational
harm. Confidentiality does not need to be the least restrictive way
260As the rule proposed in this Note requires a court to weigh interests in every case, this
specific list of enumerated topics is not central to the general approach proposed. While this
author believes that the list used in this Note is most appropriate, a court could adopt a different
or modified list of enumerated subjects and still follow this Note's proposed general approach of
subjecting enumerated cases to a presumption of access and non-enumerated cases to a pre-
sumption by which confidentiality is allowed.
211 See infra Part III.B.
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of protecting the litigants' interests. Public policy in favor of set-
tlement and case resolution should be considered strongly.262
In support of access and thus overcoming the presumption, a
judge should weigh less strongly an unusual or compelling need
for public access and the extent to which access to the settlement
information furthers the objectives of public access - to facilitate
public monitoring of the judicial system, to enhance public confi-
dence in the system, to educate the public, and to ensure fair and
accurate fact-finding.263 The public's interest increases as the
amount of judicial action increases and the further the proceeding
had progressed prior to settlement. However, a judge should be
careful to identify and disregard public interest that is mere curios-
ity, especially in cases with plaintiffs especially vulnerable to pub-
lic curiosity. Satisfaction of this type of public interest does not
further the objectives of public access. A judge should rarely grant
access if the public has alternative ways of obtaining the informa-
tion.
As Sharon Sobczak's definitions of the balancing factors
weigh in favor of access, her test is an appropriate model for the
special balancing test that should be applied to settlements involv-
ing the enumerated subjects. 264 The test begins with a presumption
of access. The special test should be applied to settlements involv-
ing the enumerated subjects: national security, government entities
or representatives, product liability and mass torts, sexual violence
and predation, and substantial threats to public health and safety.
Like Sobczak's test, the proposed test strongly presumes public
access for settlements containing these subjects. Public figures
should not be protected from access any more than should "regu-
lar" plaintiffs. In favor of access, a judge should weigh heavily
the public's interest in the enumerated information contained in the
case. The interest is stronger the more judicial action has occurred
and the further into the proceeding settlement has occurred. The
judge should consider strongly how the information contained in
the case will help inform the public and further similar cases. The
fact that the public has alternative means of obtaining the same
public interest information need not preclude access to these set-
tlement records. Public policy in favor of settlement and case
resolution need not be considered strongly.
262 Once again, while this author feels that these balancing factors are most appropriate, a
court could adopt different balancing factors and still follow this Note's proposed general ap-
proach of subjecting enumerated cases to a presumption of access and non-enumerated cases to
a presumption by which confidentiality is allowed.261 Dore, supra note 4, at 402.
2A See infra Part III.B.
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In favor of confidentiality and thus overcoming the presump-
tion, a judge should consider less strongly the nature and magni-
tude of the harm that may result to the parties if confidentiality is
not allowed. As with Sobczak's test, litigants should have to show
with evidentiary support a high probability that the harm will oc-
cur. Monetary damage should be weighed more heavily than dam-
age to one's reputation. Party reliance and the importance of con-
fidentiality to the achievement of settlement should be considered
very weakly, if at all, because it is generally not reasonable for
parties in these enumerated situations to rely on confidentiality.
Nor is it reasonable for them to formulate settlements that turn on
confidentiality because of the strong legal presumption against se-
crecy in these easy-to-recognize situations. The court should only
support confidentiality when it is certain that there is no less re-
strictive way of protecting the parties' interests, such as the sealing
of only certain documents or the use of initials or pseudonyms.
Under both tests, confidentiality and access are possibilities,
and judges retain discretion to balance the factors based on the
case at hand.
G. Implementation of the Tests
Changes in ethical rules that require attorneys to consider the
interests of the public would certainly work toward the same end
as would the rule proposed because this Note argues that the public
does have an interest in and should have a right of access to some
settlement information. However, even an ethical rule that re-
quires attorneys to disclose settlements containing significant pub-
lic information is not the best solution for several reasons. First,
the rule would create a problem of inconsistent results as attorneys
"read" their cases differently and thus interpret differently the in-
terests involved. For example, due to personal experiences and
interests, repeat products liability defense attorneys would likely
view the public interest in a case quite differently than would re-
peat products liability plaintiffs' attorneys. As an ethical rule
would still be based on a reasonableness standard (either objective
or subjective),265 such differences in view would likely be permis-
sible under an ethical rule and would result in inconsistent results.
Additionally, a rule that requires an attorney to disclose set-
tlements containing certain types of information presents the same
problems as bright-line rules that require automatic access based
265 See Zitrin, supra note 13, app. A (setting forth Proposed Model Rule 3.2(B), presented
to ABA Comm. on Evaluation of the Rules of Prof I Conduct, Feb. 2001, which contains both
objective and subjective alternate language).
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on subject matter and do not allow for case-by-case assessment.
Lastly, an attorney could make an inappropriate decision and allow
disclosure of settlement information before judicial review deter-
mines that confidentiality is appropriate, creating a situation that
cannot possibly be corrected. It is a far better approach to have the
interests involved defined and weighed by a neutral judge before
access is required. While it can be argued that a judge is not neu-
tral due to his or her participation in the proceeding prior to set-
tlement, he or she would certainly be more neutral than an attorney
who regularly serves as a compensated advocate.
The other two widely used means of achieving such a rule are
court rules and legislation. A court rule is the preferable means of
implementing the proposed rule because a judiciary that has cre-
ated and applied other balancing tests in the past is likely more
competent at defining distinct balancing factors and presumptions
than is a legislature. Additionally, it may be a lengthier and more
complicated process to draft and pass legislation than it is to draft
and pass court rules due to bicameral legislative systems and to the
influence of representatives and constituents with opposing inter-
ests. It would certainly be possible, though, for legislation to
achieve the same result as a court rule.
V. APPLICATION OF THE PROPOSED TESTS
A. AIDS Status and Sensitive Medical Information
Critics of sunshine reforms argue that under such reforms a
litigant may be required to divulge too much personal information,
such as one's AIDS status, which could be considered health and
safety information.266 David Luban defends sunshine regimes
against this privacy argument by arguing that personal informa-
tion, such as an individual's AIDS status, would not be considered
health and safety information in which the public has an interest.
Additionally, Luban argues that a judge could treat such a case as
an exception even if the information is thought to have public
ramifications. 67
The proposed rule does not rely on a narrow definition of pub-
lic health and safety information or on the formulation of some
kind of exception to protect such a litigant. Even if a litigant's
AIDS status is considered a substantial threat to public health and
safety, thus triggering the special test, that litigant's privacy may
266 Luban, supra note 5, at 2653-54 (identifying and refuting this argument).
267 Id. at 2654.
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still overcome the presumption of access, especially if settlement
occurs early in the proceeding and without much judicial action.
Though the judge should weigh heavily the public's interest in the
AIDS information, and thus should weigh heavily any risk of
transmission to members of the public, the judge may find that the
litigant has an even larger interest in privacy because such infor-
mation carries a stigma in our society and may prompt unnecessary
fear, prejudice, and even hate crimes.
To show a high probability of harm, the litigant could show,
for example, that he or she works at a place of employment where
coworkers are very likely to develop unnecessary fear of the liti-
gant if informed, such as a place where workers who are unlikely
to be educated about AIDS work in close proximity. The litigant
could show that because the disease is highly stigmatized and not
well understood, even limited revelation of the litigant's AIDS
status risks the creation of devastating gossip that would quickly
spread; thus, confidentiality is the only way to protect the litigant.
Perhaps due to the uniqueness of the case in a small community or
close environment, the use of initials or pseudonyms would not
protect the litigant's identity. Even with the application of the
special test, the judge would retain discretion to protect the liti-
gant's privacy in these types of situations.
Other confidential settlements relating to medical health have
involved mistakes by pharmacies in dispensing medication and
repeated instances of provider malpractice.268 Such settlements are
likely to be found accessible to the public under the special test
because the medical information involved is likely to be consid-
ered public health information, and the medical information the
settlements would reveal is likely less sensitive than AIDS infor-
mation. However, sensitive procedures or medication types may
be protected after case-by-case balancing is conducted through a
complete sealing of the settlement, as well as through the use of
pseudonyms or other identity protection measures.
B. Sexual Abuse by Clergy
Experts and the media estimate that at least 850 and as many
as fifteen hundred Catholic priests in the United States have been
accused of child sexual abuse over the last four decades. 269 Ex-
268 60 Minutes I1, supra note 16 (Internet coverage of the Jan. 15, 2003, lead story on 60
Minutes 11 with Dan Rather, addressing settlement confidentiality and the South Carolina rule).
269 Alan Cooperman & Lena H. Sun, Hundreds of Priests Removed Since '60s, Survey
Shows Scope Wider Than Disclosed, WASH. POST, June 9, 2002, at Al (citing a survey of
Catholic dioceses across the United States conducted by the paper and Sylvia Demarest, a plain-
tiffs' lawyer in Texas who compiled a database in the mid- 1990s of priests accused of sexual
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perts and church officials estimate that between one and six per-
cent of all priests in the United States have committed child sexual
abuse.270  Generally, church officials are reluctant to talk about
legal settlements that arise from these cases. While a Washington
Post survey found only $106 million in payments has been ac-
knowledged by the church as of June 2002, plaintiffs' lawyers es-
timate that the true amount of settlement approximates $1 billion,
and that most of those settlements have been confidential. 271 Evi-
dence suggests that priests have been kept in positions that involve
contact with children or have been repeatedly shuffled across par-
ishes, despite evidence or strong suspicion of past sexual miscon-
duct.272 Law enforcement and the judiciary are accused of contrib-
uting to the church's cover-up of the problem by failing to conduct
or dropping investigations and by conducting proceedings in se-
cret.273 The Catholic Church is only one of many religious organi-
zations facing such accusations. 74
The Superior Court of Connecticut recently ordered the un-
sealing of discovery records in twenty-three settled cases alleging
sexual abuse of minors by clergymen affiliated with the Bridgeport
Roman Catholic Diocese and accusing the diocese of a cover-up.275
misconduct). However, as of June 2003, it was estimated that 425 priests had been removed
from the ministry for abuse in the previous eighteen months alone. Cathy Lynn Grossman, A
Year After Church Scandal, Problems Amid Progress, USA TODAY, June 17, 2003, at 8D (cit-
ing the Rev. Robert Silva, president of the National Federation of Priests' Councils).270Cooperman & Sun, supra note 269 (citing A.W. Richard Sipe, a former priest who is
now a psychotherapist who counsels clergymen and victims, and Cardinal Theodore McCarrick
of Washington).
271 Id. Several larger known settlements that were listed by USA Today in June 2003 total
over $300 million. Grossman, supra note 269. In October 2003, an $85 million settlement
between the Boston Archdiocese and hundreds of alleged victims went into effect after 80% of
the victims approved the agreement. Most Plaintiffs Accept Boston Abuse Settlement, CHI.
TRIB., Oct. 21, 2003, at C19.
272 E.g., Edmund H. Mahony & Dave Altimari, A Predatory Trail, A Futile Pursuit, Priest
Questions Motives of Accusers, HARTFORD COURANT, Aug. 11, 2002, at Al; Lois Romano,
Okla. Archbishop Failed to Oust Priest, Long Trail of Abuse Prompts Criticism, WASH. POST,
May 21, 2002, at Al. In November 2003, Cincinnati Archbishop Daniel E. Pilarczyk pleaded
no contest to five misdemeanor counts of failing to report felonies. The charges involved a
long-standing cover-up of sexual abuse by priests in the archdiocese. This case marked the first
time that an archbishop or bishop entered a plea that resulted in guilt. Bill Sloat & T.C. Brown,
Cincinnati Archdiocese Found Guilty of Cover-Up, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Nov. 21, 2003,
at Al.
273 E.g., Mahony & Altimari, supra note 272 ("The sealing of lawsuits against priests was
common, particularly when it came to trying to protect the identity of the accuser."); Romano,
supra note 272. These newspaper articles both state that confidential settlements were paid to
the victims of the priests featured.
274 Teresa Watanabe, Sex Abuse by Clerics - A Crisis of Many Faiths, L.A. TIMES, Mar.
25, 2002, at Al ("The wave of clergy sex scandals now engulfing the Roman Catholic Church
has battered other denominations as well .... In the last decade, clergy sexual misconduct has
been exposed in virtually every faith tradition.").275 In re N.Y. Times, X06-CV-02-0171932-S, 2002 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1634, 32 CONN.
L. RPTR. 228 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 8, 2002) (unpublished), rev'd, Rosado v. Bridgeport Ro-
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The twenty-three cases include allegations of forcible rape of chil-
dren by priests and accused the diocese of a conspiracy involving
the reassignment of priests and the "bullying and/or misinforming"
of the victims. 276 The Superior Court used a balancing test, finding
an "extraordinary" public interest in the allegations that out-
weighed the priests' or church's interest in privacy, especially in
light of recent attention given to and acknowledgment of such
abuse by the church and the media.277 The court found it "incon-
ceivable" that the defendants could have any overriding interest. 278
The court found the public to have a strong interest not only in the
allegations themselves, but also in the diocese's response to the
allegations and in any court facilitation of a cover-up through the
use of sealed records.2 79 The court did not specifically discuss the
privacy interests of the alleged victims.
The orders to unseal, however, were stayed and recently re-
versed because the Appellate Court of Connecticut held that the
trial court had effectively restored the twenty-three cases to the
docket beyond the time limit allowed by state statue. The Court
held that the court had committed other procedural errors as
well. 280  The appellate court noted that the newspaper was well
aware that accusations had been made against priests at that time,
and "[h]ad the newspaper acted earlier, they could have received a
proper hearing on the merits of the claims and might have won
some, or even all, of the relief .... ,,28
man Catholic Diocesan Corp., 825 A.2d 153, 172, 179, 185-87 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003). There is
no indication in this case or its subsequent history that settlement information was included in
the records.276 1n re N.Y. Times, 2002 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1634, at *10- 11.277 
1d. at *14-*16.
278 Id. at *14.
279 Id. at *17-18.
280Rosado, 825 A.2d at 172, 179, 185-87.
281 Id. at 186-87. While the orders were stayed, the trial court criticized the appellate
court's focus on procedure:
The church's sexual abuse scandal has not been exposed by the courts. Coura-
geous victims and enterprising investigators have circumvented a judicial model of
cooperation with the Diocese in endlessly delaying litigation, sealing files and coerc-
ing victims into non-disclosure settlements. Rather than seeing the elephant in the
courtroom, we are diverted to the presence of the mouse, the issue of which files
should have been used.
For this court to ignore its inherent powers over its own files, behind the fig leaf
of a hypertechnical understanding of its jurisdiction, would be a dereliction of duty,
indefensible morally as well as legally.
Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., AC-23014, 2002 WL 1837910, at *6, 32
Conn. L. Rptr. 514 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 12, 2002) (unpublished) (addressing orders by the
Appellate Court to act on pending motions to intervene and to articulate the court's basis for
authority to open a new file). In response, the appellate court noted that a charge of judicial
impropriety "places a stain on the court that cannot easily be erased" and that this criticism was
"especially regrettable" because it was made without evidence and by a judge. Rosado, 825
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In two recent cases, the Superior Court of Massachusetts also
ordered the unsealing of records from eight settled cases involving
alleged sexual abuse of children by priests, but the court did leave
the plaintiffs' identities and identifying information sealed. 282 Ap-
plying a good cause test that required a compelling interest in or-
der to seal,283 the court found that "for many victims of sexual
abuse, especially child sexual abuse, public revelation of the
abuse, if not sought by them, victimizes them yet again" as it stig-
matizes them as victims, generates painful conversations, and
causes others to treat them differently.284 While the court found
this interest in privacy enough to justify the sealing of the plain-
tiffs' identities, the court did not seal the rest of the records:
"[A]part from the interests of the plaintiffs in protecting disclosure
of their identities, there is no interest so compelling as to override
the common law and constitutional presumption of public access
to court records. 285
Nor did the court find that the defendants' interest in privacy
justified additional sealing. While acknowledging that the accused
priests would indeed suffer harm to their reputations due to the
unsealing of the records, the court found that the public interest in
knowing which members of the clergy had been accused of child
sex abuse and what steps had been taken by the church in response
to accusations was "immense," especially for those members of the
public who belong to the same religious institutions as the defen-
dants.286 Keeping the defendants anonymous would make it far
more difficult for the public to evaluate their own religious institu-
tions. Additionally, the court noted that courts rarely find privacy
rights for alleged victimizers in civil cases and virtually never in
criminal cases.287 As one of the sealed cases was a complaint for
settlement approval on behalf of a minor to resolve allegations of
sexual abuse by a member of the clergy, it is likely that settlement
terms were contained in the unsealed records.288
A.2d at 167.
282Globe Newspaper Co. v. Clerk of Suffolk County Superior Court, 01-5588-F, 2002
Mass. Super. LEXIS 6 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 4, 2002); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Clerk of Mid-
dlesex County Superior Court, CA2001-5302-C, 2002 Mass. Super. LEXIS 67 (Mass. Super. Ct.
Mar. 5, 2002).
283 Globe Newspaper, 2002 Mass. Super. LEXIS 6, at * 1I- 12.
284 Id. at *19.
285 Id. at *28.
2l6 Id. at *26.
2871d. at *27 (citing Doe v. Diocese Corp., 647 A.2d 1067 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1994) (for-
bidding the use of a pseudonym by a clergy member accused of child sexual abuse); United
States v. Maling, 737 F. Supp. 684, 705-06 (D. Mass. 1990) ("The defendant must live with his
name and its attendant reputation.")).
288 Globe Newspaper, 2002 Mass. Super. LEXIS 6, at *3 n.2.
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Where such a case involves filed settlement information, the
proposed special balancing test would be applied as these cases
regard sexual violence and predation, and public access would be
strongly presumed. In weighing heavily the public's interest in the
enumerated information contained in the case, the judge would
likely find a very strong public interest, as did the trial court
judges in the Connecticut and Massachusetts cases. Again, the
interest is stronger the more judicial action occurred in the case
and the further into the proceeding settlement occurred. The judge
would likely find that the information contained in the case, in-
cluding the identities of the defendants, would help enable the
members of the public to better protect their children and help
their own religious institutions fight abuse, especially if no other
means of access to the names of accused priests exists. The acute
harm that occurs from sexual abuse makes public knowledge of the
risk more crucial.
The harm to the priests that would result from disclosure
would very likely not be compelling enough to prevent the disclo-
sure of the defendants' identities. The public interest in knowing
the defendants' identities is important, for example, to enable par-
ents to determine if their own children have been put at risk. A
judge may allow the victims to be protected by pseudonyms in or-
der to prevent serious emotional harm, but it is likely that the
judge would not find it necessary to seal all the settlement infor-
mation to protect victims' privacy interests.
Most people would agree that the result of public access is
correct in this situation because of the unique trust that people put
in members of their religious institutions, and because of the acute
need to prevent such abuse due to the very serious physical and
emotional harm that victims of sexual abuse, especially young vic-
tims, suffer. It may be argued that the proposed rule is not neces-
sary as the trial courts in these clergy cases came to the right re-
sults using their existing rules. However, the reversal of this
"right" outcome in the situation of the Bridgeport cases due to pro-
cedural problems, and the fact that the information was left sealed
upon the dismissal of each case in the first place, suggests how
important it is that courts come to appropriate results at the district
court level through the use of regularly applied and well-defined
procedures, even if settlement information was not specifically at
issue in the Bridgeport situation. Consistent, predictable results
are necessary to preserve the fairness of our judicial system and to
save court resources in the appellate process, as well as party re-
sources spent in an attempt to anticipate varying court results.
[Vol. 54:2
2003] RESPECTING LITIGANTS' PRIVACY AND PUBLIC NEEDS 563
Additionally, as such a small percentage of cases are published, it
is difficult to know how many cases do come out appropriately at
the trial court level or how many outcomes are changed on ap-
peal .289
C. Sexual Abuse in Schools
In allegations similar to those made in many clergy sexual
abuse cases, many schools have been criticized for letting employ-
ees accused of sexual misconduct resign under the terms of confi-
dential settlements that restrict the schools from revealing any in-
formation about the possible misconduct to schools that later seek
employment references.29 ° In a recent case, the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals found that a school district's provision of a neu-
tral letter of recommendation, written pursuant to a confidential
settlement with a teacher accused of abuse while employed by the
district, "[did] not rise to the level of deliberate indifference" nec-
essary for the federal section 1983 claim brought against the dis-
trict by a student abused by the teacher during later employment.2 9'
The victim accused the district, a state actor, of violating her
constitutional right to bodily integrity under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.292 The court found that the
district did not possess the necessary culpability of indifference to
the constitutional violation because it did not know with certainty
that abuse occurred during its employment of the teacher.2 93 Addi-
tionally, the plaintiff did not show that there was a direct causal
link between the district's failure to tell the future employer of the
previous allegations and the violation of the victim's rights during
the later employment. 294 The court went on to say that the provi-
sion of the neutral letter, which contained information such as ac-
tivities in which the teacher participated, his adherence to school
289 According to figures published by the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, the federal courts of appeals resolved 27,758 cases on their merits during the twelve-
month period ending on September 30, 2002. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JuD. Bus.
OF U.S. CTs. 2002: ANN. REP. OF THE DIRECTOR, tbl. S-3 (2003) (excluding the Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2002/tables/
s03sep02.pdf. Only 4,920 of these cases resulted in a written, signed, published opinion in
which the court addressed the facts and applicable law. Id. Only 416 cases resulted in a written,
unsigned, published opinion discussing the facts and law. Id. Sixty-four cases generated a
written, unsigned, published opinion that did not contain analysis. Id. Overall, 80.5% of the
cases terminated on their merits were resolved without publication. Id.
Ralph D. Mawdsley & Steven B. Permuth, Nondisclosure Provisions in School District
Settlement Agreements, 163 EDUC. LAw REP. 2 (2002).
291 Shrum v. Kluck, 249 F.3d 773, 780 (8th Cir. 2001).
292 Id. at 777-78.
293 Id. at 780.
294 Id.
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procedures, and that he "showed an interest in his students, 295 was
not reckless because "a reasonable person reading the letter might
'read between the lines' and realize that it did not unreservedly
endorse Kuck as a teacher., 296 Lastly, the court rejected a Title
IX claim because the district did not have control over the teacher
at the time of the abuse in question.297
The district had opted to settle with the teacher due to the cost
of conducting a hearing as required by the termination procedures
mandated by the teacher's employment contract.298 The settlement
contained several requirements: that the teacher be permitted to
voluntarily resign; that the superintendent write a positive letter of
recommendation; that future references be consistent with the let-
ter; that the resignation would be categorized as "with good
cause"; and that the teacher be allowed to remove all documenta-
tion from his employment file except that which the district used
when hiring him. 99 Implicitly, the court upheld the use of a confi-
dential settlement agreement under these facts involving sexual
predation.
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Colorado held a school dis-
trict liable for breach of contract and for tort claims when the dis-
trict disclosed information to the media about allegations of sexual
harassment by the district's former superintendent, which were
supposed to remain confidential pursuant to a settlement agree-
ment. 300 The court stated that "the members of the Board clearly
concluded at the time they entered into the agreement that the pub-
lic interests in the efficient administration of the school system
outweighed considerations regarding the accessibility of this in-
formation to the public."3 °1 Thus, the court left it to the parties to
consider the public's need for the settlement information, and it
considered confidentiality to be appropriately bargained for in this
situation involving sexual misconduct by a public school official.
A California appeals court, however, did not uphold the use of
confidentiality under similar facts. Following allegations of rape
and sexual misconduct involving four high school students, a
295 Id. at 776.
296 Id. at 780.
297 Id. at 781-82.
298 Id. at 776.
.9 Id.
100 Pierce v. St. vrain Valley Sch. Dist., 981 P.2d 600 (Colo. 1999). Even though this case
involves the sexual harassment of district employees and not students, it is worth noting here
due to its strong approval of the parties' ability to contract confidentially. Additionally, sexual
harassment of an employee by a supervisor is arguably sexual predation due to the power dis-
crepancy between the parties. See the following discussion of employment cases, infra Part
V.D.
301 Pierce, 981 P.2d at 607.
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school district and a former teacher entered into a settlement con-
taining a confidentiality provision. 302 The court held that because
the school had an obligation to report the allegations to the state
Commission on Teacher Credentialing, the confidentiality provi-
sion was in violation of public policy. 30 3 A similar holding was
recently reached by a Missouri appellate court, which found that
where a confidential settlement agreement was reached by the
school board, the state's open meeting law superseded the agree-
ment's confidentiality provision, and thus the existence of the set-
tlement could not be kept secret.
For the sake of analysis, it is assumed that these settlements
were filed with the court and thus would trigger the proposed rule.
These school cases would be subjected to the special balancing test
and a presumption of access as they involve sexual violence or
predation, and public school settlements would additionally be
subjected to the special test because they involve government enti-
ties. Essentially, the subject matter involved in these education
situations is similar to that involved in the clergy abuse situa-
tions - a person in power is taking gross sexual advantage of
someone in an inferior position, typically a child. The analysis
would be similar and would very likely result in access to these
settlements. Access is even more likely in these particular school
situations involving settlements between the employees and the
districts as the identities of the abused students are not mentioned
in the settlements. The reputational concerns of the parties in-
volved, like those of accused priests and church, would likely not
be enough to support confidentiality. As in the clergy cases, all of
the accused have close contact with children, and therefore the
public, including future employers, likely has a very strong interest
in the settlement information so that later abuse can be avoided.
With public schools, the public would have an even stronger inter-
est due to the schools' use of government money. Under the pro-
posed special balancing test, the courts that tolerated confidential-
ity in the educational cases described above likely came to the
wrong result.
Settlements between the districts and victims of abuse at
school would be analogous to the clergy cases in which settlements
were reached between the dioceses and victims. Such a situation
was addressed by a California appeals court when a media pub-
3 2 Picton v. Anderson Union High Sch. Dist., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 829, 831 (Cal. Ct. App.
1996).
3 Id. at 833.
304 Calvert v. Mehiville R-IX Sch. Dist., 44 S.W.3d 455 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001).
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lisher sought to unseal records indicating the settlement terms
reached between a school district's insurer and a 15-year-old stu-
dent athlete who was violently sexually assaulted on campus by
three of his teammates. °5 The juvenile court found that the school
had a "culture [of] raping-type activity" that the coaching staff
"thought to be acceptable" and never challenged. °6 The student's
attorney and the school district had held a news conference that
revealed the existence of the settlement without disclosing the
terms.307 The terms, however, had been filed with the trial court in
a petition for minor's compromise as required by statute, and the
trial court approved the settlement.30 8 The publisher sought spe-
cifically to unseal the amount of the settlement, but the district and
the student argued that the student's privacy rights outweighed the
public interest in the financial information. The district and stu-
dent identified specific harm that the student would likely endure
if the terms were disclosed:
They surmised "some people will make sick jokes and rude
comments about this despicable act of rape, when it is cou-
pled with the value of the settlement." The student's treating
psychiatrist declared the student was further victimized and
subjected to ridicule by published accounts of the assault and
would suffer more harm if the settlement amount were dis-
closed.3 9
The publisher asserted that "the public was entitled to know
the amount of the money paid in settlement because it reflected
District's culpability."3"0 The trial court declined to unseal the
file, "finding the student's right to complete his high school educa-
tion in the county and to participate in school athletics, along with
his right of privacy about the 'sexual nature of the attack,' out-
weighed the right of public access to the court records."'3 ' While
it claimed to be "sympathetic to the student's situation as a young
crime victim," the appellate court granted the motion to unseal:
The fact of a damage award, whatever size, is not in itself a
private fact deserving protection and secrecy in public educa-
tion is not in the public interest. The settlement amount is
not a trade secret, within a privilege, or likely to place anyone
305 Copley Press, Inc. v. Superior Court, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 69, 70 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
306 Id. at 70.
307 Id.
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in "clear and present danger of attack." Nor is the amount it-
self the cause of the student's "mental anguish."..... The stu-
dent has not shown his interest in sealing the amount of the
settlement, even temporarily, outweighs the public right of
access to court records.
312
The appellate court required the student to show compelling rea-
sons why confidentiality was necessary, a burden that the court did
not believe was met.313
Even under the proposed special balancing test, which begins
with a strong presumption of access, this requirement of disclosure
is likely the wrong result. This case is a good example of a situa-
tion where settlement confidentiality may be appropriate even
where enumerated material is involved. Under the special test, the
public's need for the information is strongly considered. The fact
that a suit was filed and judicial resources were used to approve
the settlement weigh in favor of access. The fact that the public
already knew about the existence of the settlement due to the press
conference would not necessarily preclude access to the financial
information as alternative access is not weighed strongly. Addi-
tionally, the public has a strong interest in knowing how its public
school funds are spent.
However, by focusing primarily on a party's interest in nar-
rowly defined trade secrets and privileged information, the appel-
late court did not weigh strongly enough the student's psychologi-
cal interest in confidentiality. Through expert testimony, the stu-
dent indeed showed with evidentiary support a high probability
that serious emotional harm would occur if the financial amount
were revealed, as was recognized by the trial court. While mone-
tary damage should be weighed more heavily than damage to one's
reputation, the psychiatrist detailed severe emotional harm that
would be suffered by the child in his daily school and sports envi-
ronments. Due to the developmental importance of the school and
sports environments to a child, such harm should be weighed more
strongly than the daily discomfort an adult would feel at having his
or her name tarnished. While the public certainly has a strong in-
terest in knowing that a school tolerates a rape culture, the exis-
tence of the settlement was already revealed in the press confer-
ence. The information that parents would receive by knowing
about the settlement's existence would be only slightly supple-
mented by knowledge of the financial information, which is not a
3-12 Id. at 74 (citations omitted).
-13 Id. at 72.
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strong indicator of culpability due to the various practical reasons
why parties settle.31 4 As the student's identity was already widely
known, there was no other way to protect him from additional
harm due to the disclosure of the financial information other than
to keep that information confidential. Thus, the public interest
does not outweigh the student's interest in avoiding disclosure.
Again, most people would intuitively find that protecting this
child from additional emotional harm is simply more important than
obtaining marginally useful additional information about the settle-
ment's financial terms. One cannot help but wonder if mere curiosity
and the need for a compelling story prompted the press to seek the
settlement amount.
D. Employment Cases
The primary question when applying the proposed rule to em-
ployment cases is whether sexual harassment cases would be sub-
ject to the special balancing test and a strong presumption of ac-
cess. Generally, sexual harassment is indeed sexual predation - a
person in power is taking sexual advantage of someone in an infe-
rior position. Sexual predation need not be violent; rather, it can
consist of the sexual coercion of a person with less capabilities or
power by someone more capable or powerful. While this certainly
describes a case in which a supervisor or other superior harasses a
lower-level employee, even lateral harassment involves the abuse
of social and psychological power. However, a judge may deter-
mine whether a sexual harassment case is predation based on the
specific facts of the case, such as the power balance between the
parties, whether touching or other physical threats were involved,
the egregiousness of the harassing behavior, and whether the har-
assment alleged can be classified as quid pro quo or hostile work
environment harassment.1 5 While arguably this initial ambiguity
may make it hard for people to predict a court's outcome regarding
confidentiality, the fact that the case involves some type of sexual
victimization would make it more reasonable to predict an out-
314 See Weinstein, supra note 29, at 61-62; Weinstein, supra note 143, at 517.
3'5 For explanation of these two types of sexual harassment that are defined by Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") guidelines as being actionable under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. §§
2000(e)-(h)-6 (2000), see Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Meritor Sav.
Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). Quid pro quo harassment occurs when a supervisor threat-
ens to make an employment decision based on an employee's acquiescence to sexual demands.
Burlington Indus., Inc., 524 U.S. at 751. Hostile work environment harassment involves "both-
ersome attentions or sexual remarks that are sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile
work environment." Id. The terms "quid pro quo" and "hostile work environment" do not
appear in the statute.
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come of public access. However, neither the application of the
general or the special balancing test would prevent confidentiality
as even the strong presumption of access necessitated by the spe-
cial test can be overcome if the facts of the case make disclosure
inappropriate.
While employment sexual predation cases involve abuse of
power, as do the clergy and education cases, the victimization of
adults instead of children makes public access under the special
test more likely in the employment context as concerns about emo-
tional harm may not be as great. The public does have a strong
interest in knowing which employers tolerate sexual predation so
that communities can put pressure on companies to curb unaccept-
able behavior and so that individuals can make informed decisions
about where to work and what businesses to patronize. However,
the court may choose to use pseudonyms to protect a victim's fu-
ture employment prospects, the victim's interest in which a court
may consider to be monetary and thus more weighty than mere
reputational concerns. If the court does not determine that the
facts of the case do not qualify as predation, the parties' confiden-
tiality agreement will likely be upheld as the public does not have
a special need for the settlement information.
Additionally, all settlements with government employers will
be subjected to the special balancing test because of the public's
strong interest in government action and the expenditure of gov-
ernment resources.316
E. Product Liability and Mass Tort Cases
In a hypothetical situation based loosely on the facts of Chi-
cago Tribune,31 7 an eighteen-year-old college football player dies
as the result of injuries sustained in a roll-over automobile acci-
dent caused by tire tread separation, weather, and road conditions.
While he was indeed driving his car over the speed limit, his driv-
ing was in no other way negligent. His parents sue the tire maker
Bridgestone/Firestone and receive a sizable settlement before trial.
Some pretrial motions were addressed by the court prior to settle-
ment. The parties agree to confidentiality, and various members of
the media intervene to obtain disclosure of the settlement terms.
Due to the court's reference to the settlement in its dismissal of the
",E.g., Hermreiter v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 281 F.3d 634 (7th Cir. 2002) (involving an em-
ployment discrimination claim against the city housing authority); Jessup v. Luther, 277 F.3d
926 (7th Cir. 2002) (involving a § 1983 action regarding employment termination by a former
vice president of a public college against the college).
317Chi. Tribune Co. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 263 F.3d 1304 (11 th Cir. 2001).
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case, the parties file the terms of the settlement with the court. It
is argued that upon revelation, settlement details will be immedi-
ately disseminated by the media, and the public will exert huge
pressure on the company to correct the defect and recall the dan-
gerous products. Arguably, lives will be saved. This secret set-
tlement is typical of the product liability settlements that confiden-
tiality critics identify as being extremely harmful to the public. It
involves a global company with far-reaching economic effects, a
product that is widely used, and a defect that causes tragic results
for people that use the product only as directed. Will such a set-
tlement be disclosed under the proposed rule?
The special balancing test will be applied to this settlement
due to the involvement of enumerated subject matter, that of prod-
uct liability. In this hypothetical, judicial resources were spent to
address pretrial motions, and thus the public interest is strong. The
public interest is also strong as the disclosure of the settlement will
very likely lead to widespread awareness about the tire problem.
As the driving situation in which the accident occurred was in no
way anomalous, similar accidents will likely occur. Any alterna-
tive means of obtaining the same public interest information, such
as the current media attention and other court cases, need not be
weighed heavily.
In favor of confidentiality and overcoming the presumption of
access, the judge should consider less strongly the nature and
magnitude of the harm that may result to the parties if
confidentiality is not allowed. Here, the parents of the young
driver would possibly suffer some social discomfort if the
settlement is disclosed, but they would not likely suffer extreme
additional emotional or reputational harm. Bridgestone/Firestone
will certainly be exposed to bad publicity and possibly more
lawsuits if the settlement is disclosed. Such bad publicity,
however, is merely reputational harm to an entity, not personal
grief suffered by an individual, and thus is not enough to overcome
the strong public interest in the information. The monetary loss
that the company might suffer due to lawsuits and to a recall is
speculative and again is not likely enough to overcome the public
interest. Neither party would likely be able to show with
evidentiary support a high probability that harm will occur.
Bridgestone/Firestone may argue that the settlement may mis-
lead the public and cause an unnecessary and debilitating panic
about a widely used product. Again, this argument should be
taken with a grain of salt. It is extremely far-fetched that people
will stop using their cars due to the existence of one settlement and
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that dissemination will thus debilitate the public; at most, people
will replace their tires, and many people will simply get their tires
checked. It is unlikely as well that the one case will prompt wide-
spread panic that will force Bridgestone/Firestone to automatically
recall the tires. It is a more likely scenario that public outcry will
lead the company and consumer advocates to do prompt investiga-
tion to determine if a recall is appropriate. The public will likely
be satisfied without a recall if prompt research is done to assure
the public that the product is generally safe.
As it unlikely that the strong presumption in favor of access
will be overcome in a typical product liability suit unless extreme
circumstances exist, the proposed rule will likely satisfy many crit-
ics of confidentiality.
CONCLUSION
A settlement is generally a private agreement between parties.
Litigant privacy should be the primary interest protected in confi-
dentiality analysis due to the practical reasons of settlement facili-
tation, to the historical function of courts, and to the parties' right
to contract. Courts should not be able to intrude upon the terms of
a settlement unless a party asks that a court somehow be involved.
Once a court is involved, however, the public has an interest in the
use of judicial resources. Courts have adopted varying procedures
to determine when settlements should be disclosed to the public,
and even courts that come to seemingly appropriate conclusions
use inconsistent and unpredictable analyses. The proposed rule
recognizes the importance of confidentiality overall and treats con-
fidentiality as an overall default by not prohibiting confidential
settlements for any case and by requiring case-by-case considera-
tion. However, the rule also recognizes a public need for certain
types of information.
In practice, the presumption of the special test may occasion-
ally allow the public to have access to personal information, but
this is the sacrifice necessary to permit public access to that infor-
mation for which the public has a unique need. Conversely, the
presumption of the general test may occasionally keep important
information from the public, but this is the price necessary to en-
sure the preservation of litigants' rights, which should be weighed
heavily in most cases.
This proposed rule comes to appropriate results when applied
to situations that have repeatedly been identified by rule-makers
and by scholars as problematic, including clergy sexual abuse
cases and product liability cases. The rule's case-by-case ap-
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proach and recognition of both the general need for confidentiality
and the special needs of the public in certain cases addresses the
concerns of both those that argue for confidentiality and those that
argue for public access.
EMILY FIFTALt
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